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TAKING STOCK OF TAKING STOCK
Poonam Purit
Silicon Valley law firms were among the first to experiment with taking
stock in their technology start-up clients. They were followed by law firms in
other financial centers in the United States and Canada, as well as more
conservative law firms in England and the rest of Europe. This Article criti-
cally analyzes the practice of lawyers taking equity in their clients as compen-
sation for legal services. First, it explains that equity billing can provide
significant private benefits to law firms and clients, and can also provide
indirect public benefits. Second, it argues that equity billing can be usefully
analogized to contingency fee arrangements. Third, it addresses ethical is-
sues raised by equity billing. And fourth, it applies the economic theory of
gatekeeping and explains that equity billing may impose externalities on
third parties such as retail investors who rely on issuers' legal counsel to
ensure compliance with securities laws. The Article concludes that a case
cannot be made for prohibiting equity billing or capping the amount of equity
that a lawyer can take in a client, and that the most appropriate form of
regulation is heightened disclosure of equity billing arrangements, coupled
with the preexisting regime of ethical rules and fiduciary principles.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati ("Wilson Sonsini")
took stock as a part of its compensation in thirty-three of the fifty-
three companies that it represented in initial public offerings (IPOs).'
Wilson Sonsini also took stock in companies in two other IPO transac-
tions where it represented the underwriter on the deal.2 Cooley God-
ward took stock in twenty of the twenty-three companies that it
assisted in going public in 1999.3
Disclosure documents filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 1999 also revealed that the firms that repre-
sented three of the top five IPOs for that year held stock in their cli-
ents.4 Of the over five hundred IPOs registered with the SEC, one-
third of the law firms acting as issuer's counsel held stock in the issuer
at the time of the offering.5 In more than 40% of these IPOs, firms'
holdings were worth more than $1 million each at the time of the
offering.6 Wilson Sonsini made the highest gain of any of these firms
1 Debra Baker, Who Wants to Be a Millionaire?, A.BA. J., Feb. 2000, at 36, 37. Its
holdings in twenty-four of those companies were valued in excess of $1 million each at the
close of the first day of trading. Id.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 37-38.
5 Id. at 37.
6 1& While the stock of VA Linux, a computer company, set a first-day gain record at
798% and earned Wilson Sonsini $21.4 million, WebVan holdings netted a greater overall
gain for the firm. See id. at 37-38.
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through its two million shares of WebVan stock, which were worth
more than $51 million by the close of their first day on the market.7
Silicon Valley law firms were among the first to experiment in
"equity billing," the practice of taking stock in high-tech clients as a
component of a law firm's compensation for rendering legal services.
Taking an equity stake in clients has become such a standard part of
Silicon Valley legal culture that some firms will not even consider a
new client unless an equity interest is a part of the deal.8 Law firms in
other established financial centers in the United States, as well as sev-
eral Canadian law firms, have accepted equity in their high-tech cli-
ents.9 Even the most conservative firms in London have accepted
equity stakes in their clients, and the trend is spreading through
Europe. 10
Placing the issue of equity billing within the context of technol-
ogy start-ups, this Article analyzes the issue of lawyers accepting equity
in their clients as compensation for legal services. Part I concludes
that equity billing provides significant private and public benefits. In
analyzing those benefits, the Article places the incentives created by
equity billing within the existing scholarship on what corporate law-
yers actually do, what value they create, and what economic realities
and competitive pressures their law firms face. Part II applies the eco-
nomic theory of agency costs to the lawyer-client relationship to ex-
amine the incentives created for both parties by different billing
arrangements and evaluates the practice of equity billing against the
virtues and disadvantages of each. Part III examines the significant
concerns associated with equity billing, including its effect on the law-
yer-client relationship. This Part concludes that market forces, ex-
isting ethical rules, and common-law principles of contract and
agency law are available to address these issues. Part IV explores the
effect of equity billing on the role of the lawyer as guardian of the
public interest, particularly in the context of the securities markets,
where a securities lawyer is perceived as a special gatekeeper in the
7 Id. at 37.
8 See Dan McMillan, Lawyers or Investors?, Bus.J. PORTLAND, Feb. 18, 2000, at 2, availa-
ble at http://porland.bcentral.com/portIand/stories/2000/02/21/focusl.html.
9 See Cameron Stracher, Beyond Billable Hours, WALL ST. J., Feb. 12, 2001, at A26; see
also Gail J. Cohen, McMillan Binch Hatches New EGG to Attract High-Tech Clients, LAw TIMEs,
Aug. 10, 1998, at 4 ("McMillan Binch has introduced a 'partnering' concept which lets
entrepreneurs pay for services with shares of their company"); Margot Gibb-Clark, Cowling
Incubates High-Tech Practice, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 8, 2000, at MI (describing Gowl-
ing Lafleur Henderson's practice of taking equity or options as payment from high-tech
start-ups).
10 Cash? How Old Econonzy, ECONOMIST, May 6, 2000, at 67, 68 (noting that one
London firm, a pioneer in venture services, now holds seventy-five equity stakes in deals
across Europe and Asia).
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enforcement of securities laws."1 This Part also questions whether the
securities lawyer is truly a gatekeeper, even in the absence of equity
billing, given the financial dependency of securities lawyers on their
clients. Part V sets out three models for regulating equity billing: out-
right prohibition, a cap on the level of equity, and heightened disclo-
sure coupled with letting market forces, existing ethical rules, and
common law principles regulate.
The Article concludes that, given American lawyers' constant in-
volvement in entrepreneurial activities that create serious conflicts of
interest,12 no special case can be made for prohibiting or capping eq-
uity billing while allowing the other activities to remain in place.
Moreover, prohibiting or capping the level of equity that a lawyer can
take in a client is also inconsistent with existing common-law princi-
ples governing transactions between fiduciaries and beneficiaries such
as managers and corporations. The Article concludes that the most
appropriate form of regulation is heightened disclosure of equity bill-
ing arrangements coupled with common-law principles, market
forces, and existing ethical rules.
I
PRIVATE AND PUBLIC BENEFITS AND COSTS OF
EQurrY BILLING
Equity billing can provide significant private and public benefits
and costs. This Part analyzes these benefits and costs.
A. Private Benefits to Clients
Equity billing provides private benefits to cash-starved clients by
providing them with a way to pay for, and thus to gain access to, pre-
mium legal representation otherwise beyond their financial reach. In
addition, by associating themselves with prestigious law firms, cash-
starved clients effectively rent their firms' reputation and benefit from
their firms' business contacts and acumen. Analysis of these private
benefits follows below.
1. The Cash Crunch
The clients who are most interested in paying for legal services by
giving up equity in their companies are often cash-starved, and prefer
to give out stock rather than pay for legal services because it conserves
11 For the seminal article on gatekeeping theory, see Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeep-
ers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53 (1986).
12 These activities include, for example, routinely practicing in dual occupations si-
multaneously; engaging in business transactions with clients; serving on the boards of di-
rectors of client corporations; and creating, managing, and controlling vast tort and
corporate class actions in which millions of dollars are invested.
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cash. 13 This practice is particularly important for start-ups, many of
which have minimal or no revenue and high expenses. Generally
speaking, start-up technology companies have little cash until their
ideas translate into a product substantial enough to attract venture
capital. 14 In particular, these types of companies lack tangible, "bank-
able" assets with which to secure bank loans because they are primarily
knowledge-based. 15 The difficulty of funding start-ups through bank
loans or other conventional financing arrangements becomes even
clearer when one considers that 60% of start-up technology compa-
nies in an average venture capital portfolio will enter bankruptcy
before investors can recoup their original stakes, while less than 10%
will ever reach the most desirable liquidity event, an IPO.16 Because
legal fees calculated on an hourly basis can be substantial, start-up
technology companies use their stock as a substitute for cash to lure
lawyers to provide them with legal services. Therefore, payment by
equity helps to keep expenses low.
2. Reputational Bonding
The cash-crunch phenomenon does not fully explain why tech-
nology start-ups are willing to pay their lawyers in equity. Prestigious
law firms, accounting firms, investment banks, and stock exchanges
also act as reputational intermediaries for their clients. 17 Reputa-
13 See Rebecca Mowbray, Taking Stock in Your Client, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 23, 2000,
at ID. As Mowbray notes, a founder of AutoInteractive.com and BigReferral.com com-
mented, "'I think it's a great idea. If we aren't successful, they don't get paid .... You get
somebody to work harder on the front end. I know if I go to them, I'm going to be one of
their top priorities.'" Id. A downside to distributing equity as compensation is that it di-
lutes existing shareholders' stakes. Shareholder dilution will be more significant if the
company is a start-up rather than a publicly traded company because there are fewer share-
holders in the former type of company.
14 See id.
15 SeeJEFFREY G. MACINTOSH, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS TO FINANCING INNO-
VATIVE ENTERPI'SE IN CANADA 57 (Gov't & Competitiveness Project, Queen's Univ., Discus-
sion Paper No. 94-10, 1994).
16 See Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Laryers and the
Suppression of Business Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 679, 685 (1996).
Suchman & Cahill note that "even the most successful new companies often take several
years to show a profit and substantially longer to offer positive returns on investment." Id.
17 See generally Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring
Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (introducing the notion of service-
providing firms capitalizing on the value of a market-developed and valued reputation).
The reputation-capital paradigm, first developed by Benjamin Klein and Keith Leffler, sug-
gests that firms that sell high-quality products in a market where consumers are unable to
distinguish between high- and low-quality producers will make the necessary investments to
establish their reputation for quality, because consumers are willing to pay a premium for
high-quality goods. The reputation for producing high-quality goods will result in an in-
come stream. If a firm cheats and produces a lower quality good, the value of its reputa-
tion goes down and it loses income. A firm that produces high-quality goods will not cheat
by producing lower quality goods so long as the benefit from cheating is less than the harm
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TAKING STOCK OF TAKING STOCK
tional intermediaries serve important functions in situations in which
companies are unable to make credible or effective reputational capi-
tal commitments to third parties on their own. Companies that are
newly established or new to the marketplace may be in this position.
As a result, they might rent the reputations of prestigious in-
termediaries "who are repeat players in the marketplace," and upon
whose reputations the market and third parties can rely.'8 As com-
pensation for lending reputational capital, intermediaries will receive
higher billing rates or commissions. The ability to serve as a reputa-
tional bond for a client depends upon each intermediary's relative
reputation. 19 The more reputable the intermediary, the higher the
rent it can charge for its bond.20
A reputational intermediary may provide its reputational bond in
the form of a legal opinion letter if it is a law firm, a comfort letter if it
is an auditing firm, or a firm commitment underwriting if it is an in-
vestment bank.21 Professor Ronald Gilson notes, in relation to busi-
ness lawyers acting as reputational intermediaries in an asset
acquisition, that "[w]hen residual final-period problems prevent a
seller from completely verifying the information it provides, a third
party can offer its reputation as a bond that the seller's information is
accurate.
'22
Empirical evidence gathered in the auditing firm context sup-
ports the reputational capital theory, because it reveals that clients
often switch to one of the large, international auditing firms just
before going public.2 3 In addition, a study by Firth and Smith found
to its overall reputation. See Karl S. Okamoto, Reputation and the Value of Lawyers, 74 OR. L.
REv. 15, 22-23 (1995); infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
18 See Okamoto, supra note 17, at 23.
19 One source, Vault.con, provides prestige rankings according to which clients may
gauge the relative reputations of law firms. According to the Vault.coin 2000 Associate Sur-
vey, the ten most prestigious firms are: (1) Cravath, Swaine & Moore, (2) Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz, (3) Sullivan & Cromwell, (4) Davis Polk & Wardwell, (5) Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom, (6) Simpson Thacher & Bartlett, (7) Cleary, Gottleib, Steen &
Hamilton, (8) Shearman & Sterling, (9) Latham & Watkins, and (10) Wilson Sonsini
Goodrich & Rosati. Vault, America's 50 Most Prestigious Firms (2000), at http://
wwv.vault.com/nr/lawrankings.jsp?law2000=l&chid=242&top50=l.
20 To some extent, prestige rankings of law firms correlate with profits per equity
partner. Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz ranked first in 2000, with profits per partner
averaging $3,385,000; Cravath, Swaine & Moore ranked third with $2,110,000; Sullivan &
Cromwell ranked fourth with $1,790,000; Simpson Thacher & Bartlett ranked fifth with
$1,655,000; Davis Polk & Wardwell ranked sixth with $1,610,000; and Skadden, Arps, Slate,
Meagher & Flom ranked seventh with $1,600,000. See Most Profits Per Partner, AM. L w.,
Nov. 2000, at 89. Wilson Sonsini failed to make the top ten.
21 See Okamoto, supra note 17, at 23 n.21.
22 See Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers. Legal Skills and Asset Pricing,
94 YALE L.J. 239, 289-90 (1984).
23 Linda Elizabeth DeAngelo, Auditor Size and Audit Quality, 3J. Acar. & ECON. 183,
194 (1981).
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that investment banks' underwriting fees were reduced when an is-
suer-client hired a large, international auditing firm in connection
with a public financing.24 They concluded that auditors serve an im-
portant bonding role and that the bonding value varies with the repu-
tation of the auditing firm.25 The results of the study also imply that
one group of reputational intermediaries may rely on another group
of intermediaries to signal client quality.
Testing the reputational capital theory in relation to investment
banks, a number of studies have found that verifying issuer quality is
the principal function of investment banks. 26 Studies conducted on
the reputation of investment banks and the pricing of new issues of
securities found that the cost of capital of an issuer decreases as the
reputation of the underwriter increases. 27
Applying the theory of reputational capital in the context of elite
law firms representing technology start-ups, it is clear that most start-
ups will often have very little reputational capital and thus only a weak
bond to offer to the marketplace. Generally speaking, prestigious law
firms are very selective of the clients they are willing to accept; they
generally avoid representing all but the most elite companies. With a
reputable law firm on its side, a technology start-up can more easily
attract capital and generate confidence in the enterprise. A prestigi-
ous law firm's willingness to lease its reputational bond to a start-up
client (by taking equity) signals to the marketplace the firm's confi-
dence in the client, its product, and the strength of the management
team.28
3. The Lawyer as Broker Between New-Economy and Old-Economy
Clients
Law firms that take equity in their clients extend their profes-
sional relationship from being solely advisors to also being sharehold-
ers. As a result, they are more likely to act to increase the value of the
client whose stock they hold. Law firms that take equity are also
known to engage in a brokering function in which they introduce
their equity-billed "new-economy" clients to their "old-economy" cli-
ents. This introduction may in turn lead to financing and strategic
alliances, and thus an increase in the client's value and their stock
24 See Michael Firth & Andrew Smith, Selection of Auditor Firms by Companies in the New
Issue Market, 24 APPLIED ECON. 247, 252-53 (1992).
25 See id. at 254.
26 SeeJames R. Booth & Richard L. Smith II, Capital Raising, Underwriting and the Certi-
fication H)pothesis, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 261, 263 (1986); RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraak-
man, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 619-20 (1984).
27 See Richard Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter Reputa-
tion, 45J. FIN. 1045, 1059-62 (1990).
28 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 16, at 680-83.
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holdings. The firms may also offer access to an extensive network of
contacts, including financing sources such as angel investors, venture
capitalists, and investment dealers, and professionals in related areas
such as accountants and valuators.29
A client could obtain a list of venture capitalists and other financ-
ing sources on its own, but because law firms are repeat players in the
marketplace, they often have an informational advantage over their
start-up clients in relation to the types of projects that are receiving
financing, by whom, and on what terms. In this manner, law firms
save their clients the expense of finding this information on their
OwnII.
Another benefit created by this brokering function relates to the
value of introductions and recommendations. The fact that an elite
law firm is willing to associate itself with a start-up speaks volumes.
While an introduction to a financing source does not necessarily guar-
antee financing, a recommendation and call from a lawyer at an elite
firm can increase the likelihood of a meeting between the potential
investors and the start-up. This benefit relates back to the law firm's
ability to act as a reputational intermediary for the client.30
4. The Lawyer as Business Advisor-When Is a Law Firm Not a
Law Firm?
A fourth factor at work is that lawyers who take equity in technol-
ogy start-ups provide more than legal advice. This observation relates
to the more general literature on what corporate lawyers actually do.
Legal scholars, writing from different perspectives, including sociole-
gal and law-and-economics perspectives, have reached the same con-
clusion, namely that a corporate lawyer acts as both a legal and
business advisor to her clients. Professor David Wilkins wrote:
Corporate lawyers have always provided a complex mix of business
and legal advice to their clients. In the 1980s, however, elite law
firms raised the business aspects of their practices to unprecedented
heights. For example, many of the country's leading law firms
moved into a variety of ancillary businesses in order to provide non-
legal services to new and existing clients. At the same time, account-
ants, management consultants, investment bankers, and a host of
other nonlawyer professionals stepped up their efforts to compete
with lawyers for the right to advise multinational corporations about
the best way to compete in the global marketplace. The dominant
philosophy underlying all of these developments is that law firms
29 See, e.g., Torys, About Torys, at http://www.torys.com/about/index.html (last visited
Aug. 25, 2001).
30 See discussion supra Part I.A2.
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and other professional service providers must take a multidiscipli-
nary approach to survive.3 1
Professor Ronald Gilson, writing from a law-and-economics perspec-
tive on the value created by business lawyers, also noted that lawyers
provide a host of services, which are not entirely legal in nature:
"[T] he business lawyer is a transaction cost engineer, whose role is to
design a transactional structure that allows the parties to act, with re-
spect to their transaction, as if the perfect market assumptions on
which capital asset pricing theory is built were accurate. '3 2 Gilson
noted, "There is nothing traditionally 'legal' about the role I have described
business lawyers as playing, nor are there any special requirements peculiar to
lawyers necessary to play this role."33 Similarly, Professor Charles Wolfram
wrote:
[MIany lawyers acquire impressive knowledge and a sense of judg-
ment in business matters through their practice, and many clients
come to regard their lawyers as both trusted legal advisors and
respected business colleagues. 3 4
Applying this theory of the corporate lawyer as both legal and
business advisor, it is conceivable that a lawyer's efforts in non-legal or
business matters are enhanced where the lawyer has a financial stake
in the profitability of the company. Craig Johnson, a former Wilson
Sonsini partner who formed Venture Law Group (VLG) in 1993, ac-
knowledged that VLG provides more than legal services: "Think of us
as a McKinsey or a Boston Consulting Group for startups, with the
added value that we can actually do deals .... We see ourselves as
somewhere between a traditional law firm and a venture-capital
firn." 3 5
Lawyers who accept clients on an equity basis provide a combina-
tion of legal and business advice that is even more skewed toward busi-
ness advice, especially in the early stages of the business lifecycle of
the technology start-up. Often the founders have a sound idea but
little business or legal experience. The start-up will seek to hire a law
31 David B. Wilkins, Everyday Practice Is the Troubling Case: Confronting Context in Legal
Ethics, in EVERYDAY PRACTICES AND TROUBLE CASES 68, 88 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 1998)
(footnote and citations omitted). See generally MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNA-
MENT OF LAwYRs: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991) (describing the
evolution of the large law firm and attempting to account for the nature and growth of law
firms); LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAwYERS' PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROFESSION (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (examining the meaning of professional-
ism in various areas of legal practice); ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAw FIRM (1988) (explaining changes in law firms'
ethics, practice, and growth over the last one hundred years).
32 Gilson, supra note 22, at 294.
33 Id. at 295 (emphasis added).
34 CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 8.11.1, at 479 (1986).
35 D.M. Osborne, Wen Is a Law Firm Not a Law Firm, INC., May 1, 1998, at 83, 84.
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firm to provide it with legal services which may include incorporation,
advice on capital structure, shareholder agreements, employment
agreements, stock option plans, and intellectual property protection.
The legal work, however, is often not the biggest part of the law firm's
job. In a typical equity arrangement, a law firm will play an essential
role in advising the client on business matters, promoting certain
transactions over others, making the company as attractive as possible
to potential investors, and introducing the client to venture
capitalists. 36
Lawyers are among the first service providers that entrepreneurs
contact to hone a strategy, establish ties with other key industry play-
ers, and prepare the start-up for introductions to investors., 7 VLG, for
example, helps refine its clients' business plans and strategies; the
lawyering does not come until later on in the relationship.38 VLG's
goal is to "treat [their] clients as business partners, to combine excel-
lent legal skills with good business judgment and to play an active role
in helping [their] clients succeed."39
As the preceding quote suggests, law firms involved in equity bill-
ing are proactive participants rather than passive third-party service
providers responding to client requests for assistance. At the Cana-
dian law firm McMillan Binch, for example, the technology lawyers
look for ways to improve their clients' companies and rather than wait-
ing for their clients to request suggestions for improvements. 40 This
active role is very different from the passive and restrained role that
lawyers traditionally play.
B. Private Benefits to Law Firms
The previous section accounts for the interest in equity billing
from a client's perspective.41 This section sets out and analyzes three
reasons why law firms are willing to engage in equity billing.
36 To attract capital from outside sources, a start-up company needs to develop a solid
business plan. While lawyers are not venture capitalists and may not have a sophisticated
sense of the client's product or market, they are well placed to advise on what ought to be
in a plan and how it should be presented. When lawyers comment on a business plan, they
are utilizing a skill that correlates closely with the preparation of a prospectus. See supra
Part I.A.3.
37 See Shawn Neidorf, Silcon Valley Lawyers Embrace VC-Like Role, VENTURE CAIrrAL J.,
Oct. 1999, at 35.
38 See Osborne, supra note 35, at 86-87.
39 Venture Law Group, About VLG, at http://wv.vlg.com/more.html (last visited
Aug. 19, 2001).
40 See Cohen, supra note 9.
41 Note that some of these benefits, such as the lawyer acting as a broker, could be
provided by law firms even in the absence of equity billing. The point, however, is that
equity billing provides better incentives than, for example, hourly billing for a law firm to
engage in activities such as brokering. Equity billing better captures the value created by a
lawyer for the client when the lawyer takes ten minutes to call a potential financing lead.
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1. Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking
While Silicon Valley law firms have been engaging in equity bill-
ing practices with technology start-up clients for many years, law firms
in other established financial centers such as New York, Toronto, and
London have only recently begun to adopt the practice. The bull
market for technology start-ups appears to have fueled interest in eq-
uity billing, and it remains to be seen how the terms of equity billing
arrangements will change as the market for technology stock rises and
falls.42
Law firms are willing to accept stock in technology start-ups be-
cause they recognize the moneymaking potential in the arrangement.
No sector of the stock market surged in 1999 like technology did, and
Internet start-ups led the way.43 Lawyers are recognizing that in this
era of instant millionaires, their (considerable) hourly billing rates are
no longer as impressive. 44
In addition, rejecting the opportunity to take stock in lieu of cash
can prove psychologically devastating. The founding partner of Fen-
wick & West, a well-known Silicon Valley law firm, declined to take
stock valued at $50,000 of the then-start-up Apple Computer and lost
an estimated $12 million in terms of the value of that stock at the time
of Apple's subsequent IPO. 4 5 From an economic perspective, the de-
cision to decline the stock may have been rational because of the at-
tendant financial risks.46 Not every start-up will turn into the next
Apple or Microsoft. Nevertheless, it can be hard to accept this kind of
"loss" in hindsight, and thus many law firms have been willing to ex-
periment with this new form of billing.47
2. Reestablishment of Long-Term Client Relationships
Law firms may also view equity billing as an opportunity to forge
longer-term relationships with clients. The lawyer-client relationship
42 While not addressed in this Article, a direction for future research in this area
would be to empirically analyze the relationship between the terms of equity billing ar-
rangements and market demand for technology stock.
43 See Baker, supra note 1, at 37.
44 Mowbray, supra note 13.
45 John C. Coffee, Jr., The New Compensation, N.Y. LJ., Mar. 16, 2000, at 5.
46 See discussion infra Part I.C.1.
47 See, e.g., Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Prob-
lem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 630, 659-60 (1999) (noting that, due to the
cognitive tendency known as the "hindsight bias," when "individuals are confronted with
unambiguous evidence of a past outcome, they often construct a hypothesis from which
they claim that they could have and would have predicted (and perhaps did predict) that
outcome");JeffreyJ. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in tw Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?,
79 OR. L. REv. 61, 66 (2000) ("People overestimate the predictability of past events: a
phenomenon known as the hindsight bias.").
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has changed dramatically in recent decades.48 In the past, clients had
tremendous loyalty to law firms and their lawyers, but clients are no
longer as loyal as they once were.49 They regularly shop around for
law firms, invite law firms to submit bids on particular transactions in
"beauty contests," and often use multiple law firms for their legal
work.50 Equity billing has the promise of reestablishing long-term re-
lationships between lawyers and clients. 5' Law firms hope that after
their initial representation, clients will use them for subsequent corpo-
rate work and transactions because it may be costly to change law
firms. 52 Clients may also feel a sense of loyalty because the law firm
did them a "favor" by agreeing to represent them on an equity basis
rather than by using a traditional billing method.
3. Retention of Associates and Partners
Some law firms view equity billing as a way to improve associate
and partner satisfaction and, in particular, to deal with the high turno-
ver rate of associates.53 For example, through its recruiting materials
portraying lawyers spending time with their families in the outdoors,
VLG markets a supposed virtue of equity billing: shorter working
hours and a more balanced life. The potential for dramatic returns
irrespective of the number of hours spent on the transaction relays a
message of freedom and opportunity.54
48 See generally Rachel S. Arnow Richman, A Cause Worth Quitting for? The Conflict Be-
tween Professional Ethics and Individual Rights in Discriminatory Treatment of Corporate Counsel,
75 IND. LJ. 963 (2000) (noting the increased reliance on in-house counsel and concomi-
tant selection of specific, specialized firms hired for particular needs); Ronald J. Gilson,
The Devolution of the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REv. 869 (1990)
(exploring clients' motivations for maintaining long-term relationships with lawyers).
49 See Amow Richman, supra note 48, at 989. While at one point, corporate clients
found it efficient to develop a long-term relationship with one firm, it is now common for
those clients to select counsel on a deal-by-deal basis, matching the discrete needs of the
transaction with the specialties of the firm. Id. Another commentator observed that the
trend in law firm retention is increasingly moving "away from bilateral monopolies toward
a competitive market in which alternative suppliers are plentiful and may be hired either
on a spot contract or an employment basis." Robert Eli Rosen, The Inside Counsel Movement,
Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479, 489 (1989). Price-
shopping and "beauty contests" are becoming standard practice. Id. at 484.
50 See Rosen, supra note 49, at 484.
51 William Zucker, a partner at Gadsby & Hannah, says that working for start-ups with
little capital involves "recognizing that some of the reward will be down the road. There's
no guarantee." Beth Healy, Lauyers as Shareholders, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 15, 2000, at Al.
52 For example, law firms gain client-specific information that enhance the efficiency
of subsequent transactions.
53 For example, Cravath, Swaine & Moore lost 37% of its associates and Dewey Ballan-
tine lost 41% of its associates in 1999. Stracher, supra note 9.
54 See id. Stracher observes:
[F]irms like Brobeck and Wilson Sonsini [are] the destination of choice for
young lawyers and law school graduates. In 1999, Brobeck grew by 45%,
leading the nation's 250 largest law firms in non-merger growth, according
to the National Law Journal. Cooley Godward, another West Coast leader,
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A significant amount of anecdotal evidence exists on the dissatis-
faction of associates and partners. 55 The concerns that they most
often express are a lack of involvement in business decisions, under-
compensation, and long hours. Lawyers often lament that they just
"paper" the transaction while the business people are involved in the
decisionmaking and do the really interesting work. What is heard
even more often is that lawyers work just as hard or even harder than
their investment banker counterparts, but earn significantly less.5 6
The argument that equity billing will address these concerns,
however, is in large part ill-conceived. Working with technology start-
ups certainly allows lawyers to do more business-related workP 7 They
are able to get involved at what some would consider the most excit-
ing stage of a company's life cycle. While partners' compensation may
increase by taking equity in clients, the potential for greater compen-
sation does not come without greater risk of loss as well. 58 However,
associates' compensation will not increase unless partners agree to
share (directly or indirectly) any increase in the value of their equity
holdings with associates.59 In terms of hours and billing, equity billing
does not necessarily reduce the pressure on associates to bill. It is
unlikely that associates at Wilson Sonsini or VLG, or in the technology
groups at leading firms have any less pressure to bill than other firms
or other departments in the same firm. Furthermore, equity billing
certainly does not relieve associates from maintaining a docket to re-
cord the hours they spend on a client's file because taking equity in
the client is usually combined with some form of hourly billing.
saw the number of students signing up for on-campus interviews increase by
36% in 1999, and 11% last fall. Meanwhile, New York firm Cravath, Swaine
& Moore lost 37% of its associates in 1999. Dewey Ballantine lost a whop-
ping 133 of its associates, or 41% of the total.
Id.
55 For example, a popular website called Greedy Associates, at http://
www.greedyassociates.com, provides a public forum for discontented associates to gripe
about law firm culture, politics, and salaries. Two other websites that post surveys from
"insiders" revealing uncensored opinions of law firm life are Infirmation, at http://
www.infirmation.com, and Vault, at http://www.vault.com.
56 See sources cited supra note 55.
57 See discussion supra Part IA.3.
58 See discussion infra Part I.C.
59 When Silicon Valley firms, led by Gunderson Dettmer Stough Villeneuve Franklin
& Hachigian's 45% hike in entry-level associate salaries, set the pace for salary raises, large
firms nationwide were quick to follow in an effort to preclude associate departure. NALP
Reference, The Salary Wars and Their Aftermath, at http://ww.nalp.org/refdesk/
salwars.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2001).
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C. Private Costs to Law Firms
While the potential upside may be significant, law firms that ac-
cept equity as compensation face significant commensurate risks.60
1. Financial Risks
Start-ups have a high rate of failure. According to one industry
report, only one in every ten start-ups ever reaches profitability. 61
Markets for new technology, in particular, are difficult to predict.6 2
The success of start-up technology companies is often dependent on
the protection of their technology by patent or copyright. Technol-
ogy companies are also under tremendous pressure to engage in re-
search and development to improve their technology, as their
products typically have a life cycle of only two to three years.63 The
very nature of representing technology start-ups requires lawyers to
maintain progressive views on their role and on the degree of risk they
are willing to assume. If the client fails, not only does the law firm fail
to make a profit, but it will have provided free legal work. The various
types of financial risk are analyzed below.
a. Liquidity Risk
A component of the law firm's risk relates to the liquidity of the
client's equity position. The law firm will not profit from taking equity
until the client exercises an exit strategy, such as merging with an-
other company or engaging in an IPO.64
As a result, law firms that engage in equity billing must assess the
probability of a company's liquidity event. This requires that a law
firm analyze the potential client's business prospects, something that
they do not need to do in relation to other potential new clients, aside
from a most routine assessment of the client's creditworthiness. Be-
cause of this liquidity risk, law firms must hold a well-diversified port-
folio of clients' equity, in order to ensure that their clients' liquidity
60 For a thorough analysis of the relationship between risk and return, see WILLIM A.
KLEIN &JOHN C. COFFEE JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES (7th ed. 2000).
61 See Andrew B. Katz & William F. Savarino, Representing a Technology Start-Up, N.Y.
LJ., Nov. 9, 1998, at T2.
62 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 16, at 688-90.
63 See John M. Cunningham, What Is a High Tech Lauyer? An Essay in Self-Definition,
CoMpUTER LAW., Mar. 1993, at 23, 23.
64 Such transactions are subject to any lock-up agreements imposed by regulations or
voluntarily entered into by shareholders. See Louis Loss &JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS
OF SECURm ES REGuLATION 498 (3d ed. 2001).
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events occur periodically and that the firm therefore has the sufficient
cash to pay current expenses. 65
b. Investment Risk
Partners draw profits from their firms on a periodic basis, but
generally do not reinvest them in the firm in the form of retained
earnings. However, law firms that accept equity in clients often hold
their stock even after the occurrence of a liquidity event out of a belief
in the long-term growth potential of the company. The value of stock
in some law firms' portfolios is so high that portfolio management has
become a principal business, and legal practice a relatively less impor-
tant or secondary activity, at these firms.66 For example, VLG's equity
portfolio was estimated to be worth more than $100 million. 67
If a law firm decides to hold its technology start-up clients' stock,
it faces the same risks as any other investor. The volatility of the NAS-
DAQ Stock Market, particularly among the shares of technology start-
up companies, is illustrative of one such risk.68 Associated with these
investment risks are the costs of maintaining the investment portfolio,
as well as costs of compliance with insider trading laws. 69 Law firms
too deeply involved with equity billing may also be caught under the
definition of "Investment Company" and would need to comply with
the relevant regulations. 70
65 This financial risk analysis also suggests that most law firms would be averse to
accepting 100% equity in lieu of cash for all their clients and would prefer instead cash
hourly billing combined with a lesser amount of equity.
66 See Coffee, supra note 45, at 1; see also Davan Maharaj, More Firms Are Willing to Work
for Stock Options, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 24, 2000, at C1 (discussing other firms with high value
portfolios).
67 As Craig Johnson, one of VLG's founders, noted: "We see ourselves as somewhere
between a traditional law firm and a venture-capital firm." Osborne, supra note 35, at 84.
68 See Guy Dixon, Turbulent Tech Market Takes Toll on Brokers, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),
May 24, 2000, at BI. The NASDAQ market has been described as "violent" as it recently
fell 25% in one week in April 2000 and rebounded nearly 19% in a four-day period in May
and June. Such instability only promises "more high jinks down the road." Terzah Ewing
& E.S. Browning, Nice Rally, but Street Still Cautious on Tech, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto),June
5, 2000, at B7.
69 Although considerable costs may be associated with insider trading compliance,
existing scholarship suggests that most law firms already have compliance mechanisms in
place. See Harvey L. Pitt et al., A.B.A., Law Firm Policies Regarding Insider Trading and Confi-
dentiality, 47 Bus. LAW. 235 (1991); Alan M. Weinberger, Preventing Insider Trading Viola-
tions: A Survey of Corporate Compliance Programs, 18 SEC. REG. L.J. 180 (1990). The prevailing
theory is that because large firms frequently deal with material nonpublic information,
they are driven by a sense of ethical responsibility and liability concerns to formulate spe-
cific policies and procedures to avoid the misuse of confidential client information and
protect reputational interests by avoiding scandal. See id.
70 See Coffee, supra note 45. As an Investment Company, the law firm would have to
register with the SEC and comply with aggressive regulations. See id.
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c. Risk of Nonpayment
Law firms that work with technology start-up clients, which tend
to be financially insecure, also face the risk that their hourly fees may
not be paid. While this risk is present even with well-established and
financially secure "blue-chip" clients, it is more pronounced with start-
ups. Perhaps this risk justifies or at least helps to explain why many
law firms take an equity interest in their technology start-up clients,
but nonetheless continue to charge their standard hourly rates. The
equity taken not only represents a premium charged by the law firm
for reputational bonding and networking services, but also represents
compensation for the risks associated with taking on a financially inse-
cure client that might not be in a position to keep up with the firm's
billings. While a retainer will mitigate some of the risk of nonpay-
ment, the start-up client may not be in a position to pay it.71
2. Reputational Risks
As noted above, law firms act as reputational intermediaries for
their clients.72 Some may argue that working with start-ups and serv-
ing as their reputational intermediaries could result in "making an
introduction that will ultimately backfire on [them] ."3 Because of
the new "partner" role for law firms that accompanies equity billing,
the argument is that law firms that are affiliated too closely with com-
panies could be placing their own reputations on the line. However,
it would appear that law firms could minimize this reputational risk by
engaging in greater scrutiny of the client's business plan and manage-
ment team.
3. Professional Risks
By accepting equity, lawyers subject themselves to professional
scrutiny about the reasonableness of their fees and whether there is a
conflict of interest between them and their clients. While it is sug-
gested in Part III below that equity billing can be reconciled with the
rule that fees be reasonable and with conflict-of-interest concerns, the
71 A financially shrewd or risk-averse arrangement from the law firm's perspective
would be to take a one percent or so equity interest, charge their standard hourly rates,
and ask for a retainer that covers their variable costs. The understanding would be that the
law firm will not ask for payment of the bill until the client receives venture capital financ-
ing, at a minimum. As a rule of thumb, a law firm's costs are usually one third of billings.
As a result, the firm should ask for a $10,000 retainer to cover up to $30,000 worth of legal
work. The $10,000 retainer will cover the costs of the time that associates and partners
spend on the client's legal matters. On the downside, if the firm does not get paid the
other $20,000, it has not lost anything out of its pocket. On the upside, if the client is
successful, the law firm will receive the remaining $20,000 plus a premium reflected in the
increase in the value of the equity it holds.
72 See discussion supra Part I.2.
73 Suchman & Cahill, supra note 16, at 699.
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novelty of equity billing means that lawyers who engage in this prac-
tice might nonetheless be subject to increased scrutiny.74
4. Mitigating the Risks: Selectivity and Diversification
Law firms that engage in equity billing will attempt to minimize
the risks noted above, and will negotiate to be appropriately compen-
sated for bearing them. There are two methods through which law
firms will attempt to reduce the risks they face: First, they can exercise
heightened selectivity in the clients to whom they offer equity billing
arrangements. Second, they can diversify their client base.
The client selection process varies from firm to firm. Some will
only take equity in clients whose management has several exit strategy
options,75 while others base their decision on the client's financial ex-
pectations and on an assessment of management's competence and
sophistication. 76 Many Silicon Valley law firms screen prospective
technology start-up clients not only for their technological prowess
but also to determine whether a client is "serious, focused, coopera-
tive, businesslike, and so on."'77 VLG adds a twist to their selection
criteria: they take equity in the clients that they deem to be most excit-
ing and cutting-edge.78 Linklaters & Alliance, a London-based firm,
follows a more conservative approach: 75% of their decision is based
on the quality and experience of the management team and 25% on
the business proposition.79
Additionally, a firm will often have its own technology due dili-
gence team to verify the potential of the business' technical aspects.80
For example, Wilson Sonsini encourages its lawyers to take into ac-
count: (1) the financial ability of the client to pay for its services; (2)
whether agreeing to represent the client will create conflicts with
other clients; and (3) whether the client's business proposal is
reasonable.8'
Diversification is the other method that law firms employ to miti-
gate risk. In this respect, equity billing arrangements are analogous to
contingent fee arrangements, which are described as being "likened
74 See discussion infra Part III.
75 These options may include going public, selling to a larger entity, or merging with
a similar business. See Cindy Krischer Goodman, The Stock-for-Service Swap, MIAII HERALD,
May 7, 2000, at 1E.
76 See Suchman & Cahill, supra note 16, at 698.
77 See id. at 698 n.58 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78 See Osborne, supra note 35, at 86.
79 Linda Tsang, E is forE-Commerce and Ethics, INDEPENDENT (London), May 2, 2000, at
10.
80 See id.
81 See MARK SUCHMAN, ON THE ROLE OF LAW FIRMs IN THE STRUCTURATION OF SILICON
VALLEY 28 (1993) (Disputes Processing Research Program, Inst. for Legal Studies, Working
Paper DPRP 11-7, 1994).
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to a lottery ticket, the more tickets you have, the better the chance of
holding a winning ticket."82 Law firms that hold a large and well-di-
versified portfolio of clients' equity can expect to return an overall
profit.
D. Public Benefits
From a public policy perspective, equity billing arrangements,
similar to contingency fees, create a financing device that allows
broader access to important legal and nonlegal services. Equity billing
encourages elite corporate law firms to advise clients that they would
not normally represent. However, unlike contingency fees, which are
often frowned upon because the lawyer is viewed as profiting from a
client's misfortune, taking an equity share in a start-up does not ap-
pear to carry as much of a negative stigma amongst the elite corporate
law firms. Perhaps this is because lawyers are not seen as profiting
from their client's misfortune, but rather as partnering with their cli-
ent to build a fortune. Furthermore, the typical start-up client is more
sophisticated than the typical contingency fee client and may have ac-
cess to other advisors to assist in assessing the lawyer's equity fee ar-
rangement, addressing some of the concerns surrounding the lawyer-
client relationship.8 3
Not only do lawyers provide important legal advice that helps to
create certainty with respect to their clients' relationships (share-
holder relationships, employer-employee relationships, tax planning,
and so forth), but they also provide their start-up clients with impor-
tant nonlegal services, such as access to networks and reputational
bonding services.8 4 An argument could be made that law firms which
have agreed to bill clients on an equity basis should be credited for
facilitating the success and development of the high-tech industry and
hence for such public goods as the creation of employment.
82 Ronald D. Rotunda, Moving from Billable Hours to Fixed Fees: Task-Based Fees and Legal
Ethics, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 819, 819-20 (1998).
83 See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
84 See discussion supra Part I.A. Karl Okamoto observes in relation to concerns about
reputational intermediaries:
[T]he privilege of a group to accept some also empowers them to exclude
others. This raises the specter of exclusion based on inappropriate catego-
ries such as race, gender or socio-economic background. Indeed the elite
law firms of the United States must be, as a group, some of the most nondi-
verse institutions that can nevertheless wield the power that they do. It
would be surprising if such monolithic organizations managed nevertheless
to extend their reputational services to all members of society in a way unaf-
fected by irrational criteria such as socially constructed stereotypes or bi-
ases. Therefore a decline in their value as reputational bonds might be a
positive social development. It might signal an opening in the markets in
which law firms and other intermediaries previously functioned as neces-
sary, but sometimes exclusionary, gatekeepers.
Okamoto, supra note 17, at 44 (footnote omitted).
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II
EXISTING MODELS OF BILLING
When applied to the lawyer-client context, agency theory pro-
vides a useful way to examine the incentives created for both parties
by different billing arrangements. 8 5 Since clients have difficulty in
monitoring the price and quality of legal services, lawyers have the
opportunity to engage in self-interested behavior. 86 Market forces, as
well as legal and ethical rules, attempt to reduce the divergence of
interests between lawyers and clients.8 7
In order to make a properly informed judgment on the practice
of equity billing, it is necessary to evaluate it against the relative merits
of existing billing arrangements. As a general conclusion, each of the
billing arrangements that law firms currently use involves agent-princi-
pal conflicts and is susceptible to abuse.
A. Hourly Billing
Lawyer compensation has traditionally focused on the concept of
hourly billing, which is considered to be objective. Most legal work at
major law firms is billed on an hourly basis. Law firms calculate legal
fees by multiplying the number of hours a lawyer spends on a file by
her hourly rate, which is based on seniority and experience. 88 Law-
85 See generally ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MANqs, THE MODERN CORPORA-
TION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932) (identifying the key organizational problem of the
modem corporation as the separation of ownership and control); Sanford J. Grossman &
Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 ECONOMETRICA 7 (1983) (dis-
cussing an alternative approach to the principal-agent problem); Michael C. Jensen & Wil-
liam H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 306 (1976) (analyzing the effect of outside equity on agency costs
by comparing the behavior of a manager who owns 100% of the firm to her behavior when
outsiders own the firm).
86 See Gillian K. Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice
System, 98 MICH. L. REv. 953 (2000) (arguing that lawyers have incentives to behave in
accordance with the standard economic model of self-interest by padding bills and disre-
garding the impact of particular arguments or strategies on the cost of law).
87 For scholarship applying agency theory to gain insights on the divergence of lawyer
and client interests in various contexts, see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of En-
trepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 877 (1987) [hereinafter Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation]; John C. Coffee, Jr., The Un-
faithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1985, at 5 (suggesting that plaintiffs' attorneys should be viewed as risk-taking
entrepreneurs outside of their clients' control); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
An Economic Analysis of Conflict of Interest Regulation, 82 IowA L. REv. 965 (1997); and
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role in Class Action and
Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1
(1991) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role].
88 WOLFRAM, supra note 34, § 9.2.2, at 504 & n.58 (noting that in the not-too-distant
past, a typical legal bill contained no information other than the words "for legal services
rendered," and that today, the almost universal practice of lawyers is to justify bills with
elaborate details of hours worked); John A. Beach, The Rise and Fall of the Billable Hour, 59
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yers prefer hourly billing because of the uncertainty and unpredict-
ability of professional effort that may be inherent in legal work, and
because they fear scaring away a client by quoting a large flat fee. Un-
like contingency fees or equity billing, where the lawyer must make a
business decision as to whether to accept the client, the lawyer in an
hourly billing arrangement focuses exclusively on the provision of le-
gal work. Consequently, outside of the risk of nonpayment by the cli-
ent (which can be minimized by the use of upfront retainers) the
hourly billing system involves minimal risk to the lawyer. 89
1. Variations
Of course, straight hourly billing does not constitute the only way
in which lawyers can structure the compensation that they receive for
rendering legal services. Within the general framework of hourly bill-
ing, many firms employ more complex billing arrangements, such as
capped fees, discounts, and premiums, and a different rationale un-
derlies each method. A brief discussion of the mechanics of each
variation follows, as does a critique of current practices.
a. Capped Fees
Capped fees represent a variation on the traditional hourly bill-
ing arrangement. Capped fees are becoming popular among clients
as law firms compete with one another in "beauty contests" for new
work. Under this method, law firms bill clients based on time spent by
each lawyer on the matter multiplied by his hourly rate to an agreed
maximum total fee. Lawyers cannot bill the client for anything be-
yond the capped fee without client approval.90
To set the capped fee, the firm estimates the total hours that each
lawyer will require to complete the task. The law firm bears the risk of
under-compensation if the estimate is too low, particularly where it
cannot anticipate all of the complex issues that might arise.9 1
b. Discounts
Another variation on the traditional hourly billing arrangement
involves the law firm offering a percentage discount on fees billed at
the standard hourly rates of each lawyer who works on the client's
matter. This type of arrangement serves to reward clients for bringing
ALB. L. Rmv. 941, 944-47 (1996); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., Understanding the Costs of Litiga-
tion: The Case of the Hourly Fee Lawyer, 1985 Am. B. FOUND. REs. J. 559.
89 See WOLFRAM, supra note 34, § 9.2.2.
90 See Comm. on Lawyer Bus. Ethics, Am. Bar. Ass'n, Business and Ethics Implications of
Alternative Billing Practices: Report on Alternative Billing Arrangements, 54 Bus. LAW. 175,
182-84 (1998).
91 See id. at 183.
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business to the firm.92 In general, law firms only agree to discount
hourly rates for established clients who are significant to the law firm
in terms of aggregate billings. The economic rationale for providing
discounts is that the marginal decrease in revenue resulting from the
discount is less than the marginal increase in revenue from the addi-
tional business, such that the law firm is better off overall.
c. Premiums
Some law firms, especially during strong economic times, charge
their clients a premium above and beyond the amount billed based on
standard hourly rates. The firm justifies charging a premium by
claiming that it is providing more value to the client than what is re-
flected by hourly billing. Premiums are often charged in connection
with mergers and acquisition transactions where such value is being
created from the perspective of clients that they are willing to pay the
extra fee.93
2. Critique
Despite the benefits of hourly billing, lawyers and clients are in-
creasingly critical of the practice. Some lawyers argue that it does not
reward them for the value of their work, but solely for the time it takes
to complete it. 9 4 Others resent having to account for every six min-
utes of their working lives and regard docketing as an inefficient use
of their time.95
From an agency perspective, two issues stand out with respect to
hourly billing arrangements. First, how does the law firm decide how
many hours to spend on a matter? Second, how can a client effec-
tively monitor her lawyer's real or claimed effort?96 For example, a
lawyer can draft a ten-page joint venture agreement but can also draft
a more complex and sophisticated fifty-page joint venture agreement.
So long as the law firm has partners and associates who have "time" to
work, there is an incentive to spend more time on individual matters
and hence create complex and lengthy agreements.
92 See id.
93 For example, in the Time Warner/AOL merger, Time Warner agreed to allow its
law firm, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, charge a premium of $35 million if the merger was
successfully completed. See Krysten Crawford & Karen Hall, High Rollers, AM. LAW., Feb.
2000, at 19.
94 See Robert S. Banks, Time-Keeping Isn't the Answer, Am. LAw., Apr. 1992, at 39; Beach,
supra note 88, at 943; Charles H. Carman, Your Role in Restructuring the Legal Industry, CoRP.
LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 1992, at 4 ("Hourly billing is the root of suspicion, poor service and bad
customer relations.").
95 See, e.g., sources cited supra note 94.
96 See Daniel L. Rubinfeld & Suzanne Scotchmer, Contingent Fees for Attorneys: An Eco-
nomic Analysis, 24 RAND J. EcoN. 343 (1993).
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Clients are frequently in no position to scrutinize the amount of
effort and time that has been, or should have been, put into a matter.
This makes hourly rate billing especially risky because it has the poten-
tial to encourage lawyers, especially those who must reach target billa-
ble hours, to take excessive or inefficient amounts of time to complete
tasks. 97
The law firm's desire to maintain its reputation for responsive-
ness to clients' needs should act as a countervailing force to the incen-
tive to spend excessive amounts of time on a matter. Thus, a fifty-page
agreement should only be drafted where such level of detail would be
valuable to the client. In addition, ethical rules barring unreasonable
fees should also act to discourage excessive billing.98
B. Flat Fees
Although less popular among law firms than the billable hour,
some law firms use flat fees for such legal work as residential real es-
tate transactions, the incorporation of businesses, and simple family
law cases. For more complex files, flat fee billing arrangements re-
quire lawyers and clients to have a clear understanding of the scope of
the work covered.
Clients benefit from flat fee arrangements because they can easily
predict their legal expenses. 99 Another virtue is that the flat fees en-
courage efficiency on the part of lawyers, because similar to capped
fees, they will not earn more than the negotiated amount. However,
unlike capped fees, lawyers cannot earn less than the negotiated
amount. As a result, this arrangement may provide a disincentive to
lawyers to be thorough in the scope of the tasks they perform. 10 0 This
fee arrangement works well for lawyers in a position to accurately esti-
mate the amount of time required to handle a particular file. 10 How-
ever, clients have an incentive not to disclose information until after
the fee is set.
C. Contingency Fees
Contingency fee arrangements provide a direct link between the
fees earned by lawyers and the results obtained for clients. In the liti-
gation context, a typical contingency fee arrangement gives the lawyer
97 See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 87, at 17-18.
98 See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
99 See Charles S. McCowan, Jr. & Esteban Herrera, Jr., Alternative Fee Arrangements:
TIME for Consideration, 43 LA. BJ. 466, 468 (1996).
100 See Comm. on Lawyer Bus. Ethics, supra note 90, at 182, 186.
101 See George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REv. 91, 98.
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a percentage of the plaintiff's award if the lawsuit succeeds, in ex-
change for bearing the risk of no compensation if the lawsuit fails. 10 2
Contingency fees are justified primarily because they enhance ac-
cess to the civil litigation system. They enable individuals who would
not otherwise be able to afford the cost of hiring a lawyer to do so.
Contingency fees are attractive to clients who are risk averse or face
free-rider problems as in the class action context. While the contin-
gency fee arrangement poses no financial risk for clients, the price
they pay for shifting the risk of loss to lawyers is often a significant
portion of recovery. A common contingency fee is one-third of the
proceeds of litigation. 10 3
Contingency fees are controversial. 10 4 Though historically pro-
hibited by common law and statutes, contingency fees are now permit-
ted in the United States and in most jurisdictions in Canada. 10 5
Contingency fee arrangements are used primarily by plaintiffs' per-
sonal-injury lawyers and are criticized as being ambulance-chasing
schemes that benefit lawyers rather than clients. Many legal commen-
tators regard contingency fee arrangements as promoting lower pro-
fessional standards and meritless litigation.10 6
At their core, contingency fee arrangements enable law firms to
finance the provision of legal services. The firms continue to pay their
associates, support staff, and overhead, but will only collect their fees
when they win or settle a case.
Law firms entering into contingency fee arrangements must en-
gage in business decisions as to whether to accept any particular case
on such a basis. Among other factors, firms must assess the merits of
the lawsuit, the magnitude of likely recovery, the likelihood of win-
ning at trial, the likelihood of settlement, and the time frames for
such events. The firms must also analyze whether the particular case
fits well within their portfolio of existing and prospective contingency
fee cases. Law firms that accept cases on a contingency fee basis obvi-
ously bear greater risk than those that use hourly billing
arrangements.
102 See generally LESTER BRicKMAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES (1994) (dis-
cussing the present fee system and presenting an alternative); Kevin M. Clermont &John
D. Currivan, Imprving on the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. Rv. 529 (1978) (same); James
D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Expertise and Contingent Fees: The Role of Asymmetric Informa-
tion in Attorney Compensation, 9J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1993) (applying economic analysis);
Rubinfeld & Scotchmer, supra note 96 (same).
103 See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Wages of Risk: The Returns of Contingency Fee Legal Practice,
47 DEPAUL L. REv. 267, 285 (1998).
104 See BRICEMAN ET AL., supra note 102; Kritzer, supra note 103.
105 See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 510-11 (3d
ed. 1999).
106 See Marc Galanter, Anyone Can Fall Down a Manhole: The Contingency Fee and Its Dis-
contents, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 457, 457-68 (1998); Kritzer, supra note 103, at 267-69.
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Law firms that bear the additional risk associated with contin-
gency fees can reap significant rewards. Although there is some risk
of ultimately rendering services for free, evidence suggests that contin-
gency fees as a whole produce profits greater than those generated by
hourly billing arrangements, particularly for those firms that develop
expertise and processes for handling many similar cases.' 0 7 To be
profitable, law firms that accept contingency fee arrangements must
ensure that they hold a well-diversified portfolio of cases that will
ripen at appropriate times to cover their expenses.' 08
Contingency fees create different incentives for lawyers and cli-
ents as to when to settle, how much to settle for and how much effort
to expend on a matter. 0 9 Illustratively, in relation to incentives to
settle, if the contingency fee arrangement cannot be renegotiated,
and new information is brought to surface suggesting a significantly
reduced likelihood that a damages award will be forthcoming at trial,
the plaintiff may wish to continue the litigation nonetheless because
he does not bear the risk of loss. On the other hand, the lawyer, who
has to bear the additional costs associated with continuing the litiga-
tion, may wish to settle instead. This divergence of incentives has
been a source of much criticism, particularly in class actions where the
class has little or no control over the lawyers who run the litigation." 0
Their incentives to settle and expend effort may diverge significantly
from those of the class. For example, lawyers for the class may wish to
settle early in the process before they expend a significant amount of
effort, even though more effort and a later settlement would result in
a greater recovery for the class.
Contingency fees are regulated in an attempt to address the
agency problems discussed above. Because a lawyer takes a vested fi-
nancial interest in the outcome of a case involving contingency fees,
the potential for a conflict of interest arises. The American Bar Asso-
ciation (ABA) requires that contingency fee arrangements be in writ-
ing with the method of calculation of the fee set forth to ensure that
the client is informed of how the fee will be determined."' In the
context of class actions where additional agency problems arise, fur-
107 See Kritzer, supra note 103, at 285-90.
108 The evidence available as of 1989 is summarized in Lester Brickman, Contingent Fees
Without Contingencies, Hamlet Without the Prince of Denmark, 37 UCLA L. REv. 29, 105-11,
132-34 (1989), concluding that the contingent fee results in higher transaction costs in
high-stakes cases and larger-than-average returns on lawyer time in smaller cases.
109 SeeWoLFRAi, supra note 34, § 9.4; Thomas D. Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Profes-
sional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 702, 732 (1977); Rubinfeld & Scotchmer, supra note
96, at 346.
110 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 87, at 897-98; Macey & Miller, Plain-
tiffs' Attorney's Role, supra note 87, at 7 (describing agent-principal problems created by
contingent fees in class actions).
111 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CoNDuCr R. 1.5(c) (2000).
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ther regulatory safeguards have been implemented.1 12 Courts must
approve settlement of class actions to ensure fairness to the class. 13
Courts must also review lawyers' fees to ensure that they are not receiv-
ing an unreasonable amount of compensation at the expense of the
class. 114 Critics of contingency fee arrangements doubt whether judi-
cial involvement results in satisfactory settlements or levels of lawyer
compensation.
D. Investor Financing
A relatively new method of financing legal fees is through the use
of investors who finance a legal matter in return for a share of any
successful recovery. 115 Investor financing resembles contingency fee
arrangements but does not limit the class of investors exclusively to
lawyers. In terms of bearing risk, the client is in the same risk position
as she would be in a contingency fee arrangement. The lawyer is pre-
sumably in the same risk position as she would be in an hourly billing
arrangement. The investor bears the risk that the litigation may not
succeed in exchange for a stake in the upside. Investor financing may
impose additional agency costs because of the possibility of encourag-
ing frivolous litigation, discouraging settlement, and stripping the cli-
ent of effective control."16
E. Comparison with Equity Billing
Law firms that engage in equity billing structure their compensa-
tion packages in one of three ways. First, law firms may simply accept
equity in lieu of cash as total compensation for legal services. Second,
law firms may accept equity coupled with discounted hourly rates.
Third, law firms may charge their standard hourly rates and accept
equity as a form of premium.
Which type of equity billing arrangement is optimal from a law
firm's perspective? It is unlikely that a law firm could survive entirely
on equity billing for all of its clients because it is difficult to predict
with a high degree of accuracy the value and timing of a particular
client's liquidity event. If a law firm is billing a high proportion of its
clients exclusively on an hourly basis, then the firm can afford to take
the risk associated with accepting the occasional client entirely on an
equity basis. Generally speaking, if a law firm is considering taking
1 12 See Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role supra note 87, at 27-96.
113 See id. at 44-48.
114 See Coffee, Entrepreneurial Litigation, supra note 87, at 898; Macey & Miller, Plaintiffs'
Attorney's Role, supra note 87, at 11.
115 See Poonam Puri, Financing of Litigation by Third-Party Investors: A Share ofJustice?, 36
OsGooDE HALL L.J. 515 (1998).
116 Id. at 531-44.
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equity in a significant portion of its clients, a hybrid approach of eq-
uity, along with standard or discounted hourly rates, is a better strat-
egy from a risk minimization standpoint. In fact, most elite law firms
in the United States and Canada prefer to take on new technology
start-up clients by agreeing to a relatively small (one percent or so)
equity stake in the client coupled with their standard hourly rates. 117
Which type of equity billing arrangement is optimal from a cli-
ent's perspective? All else being equal, a client would prefer to be
billed on an equity basis rather than be charged standard hourly rates
if it needed to preserve its cash. In addition, the more equity a firm is
willing to accept, the stronger the signal that is sent to the market-
place of the firm's confidence in the business venture and manage-
ment team.
How does equity billing compare to other types of billing ar-
rangements with respect to risk and return? Given the greater risks
involved in equity billing, one would expect the returns to be greater
than those that can be earned by hourly billing. In several respects,
equity billing can be analogized to contingency fees. First, equity bill-
ing allows clients who may not have the funds to pay for legal services
to obtain them. Equity billing is to corporate transactional work and
start-up clients what contingency fees are to litigation and access to
the courts. Second, because law firms bear a greater risk of nonpay-
ment than with hourly billing, their potential returns are greater as
well. Third, lawyers must engage in a cost-benefit analysis to deter-
mine whether to accept the representation. In the context of contin-
gency fees, lawyers must evaluate the prospects of their clients' legal
claims (likelihood and size of outcome), something which they are
well equipped to do. 118 In the context of equity billing, lawyers must
evaluate their clients' business ideas in order to determine the likeli-
hood of liquidity events.
Although at first glance, one might question lawyers' abilities to
make such assessments of their clients' long-term prospects, a compel-
ling case can be made that lawyers in fact possess the analytical tools
to make these types of judgments. For example, if the value of the
business depends upon the strength of the legal protection for a key
asset (as would be the case with an invention that needs to be or has
already been patented), then a lawyer would be well equipped to de-
termine the likelihood of patentability and thus the value of the busi-
ness. Similarly, a lawyer is in a good position to assess the vulnerability
117 However, Shearman & Sterling has adopted a policy of accepting equity in lieu of
cash up to 50% of its fees to an upper limit; similarly, LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae
prefers to receive at least 70% of its fees in cash but is willing to accept equity in a client up
to a value of $50,000. Stracher, supra note 9.
118 See discussion supra Part II.C.
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of a "blocking" patent of a non-client. Even in situations in which the
analysis does not turn solely on the application of legal principles, law-
yers are generally well-positioned to make business judgments. As
many commentators have noted, lawyers do not engage exclusively in
providing legal advice to clients.' 19 Business skills and business valua-
tion are learned on the job; over time, lawyers develop a capacity to
judge businesses. The recent rise of law firm partners, associates, and
newly minted law graduates entering investment banking and man-
agement consulting suggests that individuals trained as lawyers may
indeed have valuable business skills.
From an, agency perspective, what incentives are created by equity
billing? Just as contingency fee arrangements narrow the gap between
the interests of lawyers and plaintiffs,120 equity billing aligns the inter-
ests of lawyers and shareholders. Equity billing creates incentives for
lawyers to provide services that reach beyond the traditional scope of
law practice and advice. It encourages lawyers to expend effort to
make the business more valuable by making it grow in order to reach
a liquidity event.
As with contingency fees, which, according to some commenta-
tors create incentives for lawyers to encourage frivolous or non-meri-
torious litigation, 21 it can be argued that equity billing creates
incentives for lawyers to encourage clients to develop nonessential or
nonviable business ideas and technology. The notion is that a lawyer
would be willing to assist a technology start-up only on the basis that it
may make the lawyer wealthier. However, as described in Part I, law-
yers who accept equity are selective in the clients that they are willing
to represent, so that a potential client who has a technology which, in
the lawyer's judgment, is not viable will not be represented.
While the economics of contingency fees and equity billing are
similar, the politics are quite different. We have witnessed years of
battle in most jurisdictions to allow for or authorize contingency fees,
but equity billing arrangements have been endorsed and approved in
a relatively short period of time by lawyers' regulatory bodies. The
reason for the differing treatment may be because contingency fees
and equity billing deal with two different hemispheres of lawyers and
clients. Contingency fees deal with relatively less powerful individual
clients and small firm practitioners compared to equity billing which
deals with relatively more powerful business clients and large firm law-
yers. In addition, contingency fees create more direct and visible ex-
119 See discussion supra Part II.A.2.
120 See discussion supra Part II.C.
121 But see Herbert M. Kritzer, Contingency Fee Lauyers as Gatekeeper in the Civil Justice
System, JUDICATURE, July-Aug. 1997, at 22, 22-29 (concluding that contingency fee lawyers
do screen and turn down cases, thus acting as gatekeepers to the civil justice system).
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ternalities than equity billing. Contingency fees increase the levels of
litigation in a society and therefore add direct costs to the civil justice
system. Equity billing appears to be a purely private transaction with
no effect on third parties. The externalities that may arise from equity
billing are much more subtle and imposed on groups of people (such
as public shareholders or other investors), each of whom are im-
pacted in a small way, rather than a monolithic institution such as the
administration ofjustice.
III
THE EFFECT OF LEGAL ETHIcs AND FIDUCIARY DuTms ON
THE LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
One set of concerns surrounding equity billing relates to the ef-
fect of equity billing on the lawyer-client relationship. ETHICSearch
of the American Bar Association Center for Professional Responsibil-
ity reports that it has received numerous inquiries on the propriety of
lawyers accepting equity interests in clients in lieu of monetary com-
pensation.1 22 The number of lawyers searching for an opinion on the
topic suggests that there is much uncertainty about the ethical issues
surrounding this type of arrangement, and that there is a clear need
for clarification.' 23 Based on an analysis of the relevant rules of pro-
fessional responsibility and their interpretation in other contexts, eq-
uity billing as a general matter can be reconciled with the ethical duty
of lawyers to charge their clients reasonable fees. Concerns surround-
ing conflicts of interest between law firms and their clients can be
addressed by compliance on the part of firms with existing ethical
safeguards on lawyers transacting business with their clients. 124 Other
conflicts that result from equity billing can be addressed by more gen-
eral ethical rules on conflicts of interest requiring law firms to provide
full disclosure and to obtain informed consent from their clients.
While lawyers who engage in equity billing may expose themselves to
discipline by their self-regulatory bodies, the reality is that professional
discipline in the context of fee arrangements is very rare, particularly
where competent business clients are involved.' 25 Nonetheless, a cli-
ent may attempt to invalidate an equity billing arrangement on the
basis that her lawyer violated fiduciary duties. However, as a general
matter, equity billing can function within the fiduciary duties that law-
yers owe to clients.
122 See Peter H. Geraghty, Ask ETHICSearch, PROF. LAW., Summer 2000, at 21.
123 See id.
124 See id.
125 Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 6-7
(1991).
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A. The Regulation of Legal Fees
ABA Model Rule 1.5, its enumerated factors, case law in the area,
and a number of opinions rendered on the issue of equity billing pro-
vide useful guidance for determining whether equity billing can sit
comfortably with the rule that lawyers' fees be reasonable.
1. Fees Must Be Reasonable
Unlike the provision of most other goods or services, there are
upper limits to the price that lawyers can charge for rendering legal
services.1 26 This regulation of prices suggests that consumers have dif-
ficulty in monitoring the quality and assessing the price of legal ser-
vices. The Third Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers
("Restatement") succinctly states:
Courts are concerned to protect clients, particularly those who are
unsophisticated in matters of lawyers' compensation, when a lawyer
has overreached. Information about fees for legal services is often
difficult for prospective clients to obtain. Many clients do not bar-
gain effectively because of their need and inexperience. The ser-
vices required are often unclear beforehand and difficult to
monitor as a lawyer provides them. Lawyers usually encourage their
clients to trust them. Lawyers, therefore, owe their clients greater
duties than are owed under the general law of contracts. 127
Therefore, regulation of legal fees reflects a public policy of promot-
ing access to the justice system.' 28 The ABA has adopted a "reasona-
ble[ness]" standard to ensure that legal fees are not excessively
high. 129 Rule 1.5(a) of the ABA's Model Rules reads that "[a] lawyer's
fee shall be reasonable. '" 130 Courts will apply Rule 1.5 when a lawyer
sues her client for unpaid legal fees or when a client sues his lawyer to
126 For general background discussion, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOcK, THE LIMITs OF
FREEDOM OF CoNTRAcr (1993). The upper limit for the price of most other goods and
services is judged using a standard of unconscionability.
127 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. b (2000).
128 See id.
129 Id. § 34.
130 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2000); see also MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(B) (1969) ("A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that
the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee."). Along similar lines, the Law Society of Upper
Canada (LSUC) Rule 2.08 of the Rules of Professional Conduct states that a lawyer shall
not "charge or accept... a fee.., unless it is fair and reasonable and has been disclosed in
a timely fashion." LSUC RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R_ 2.08(1) (2001) (LSUC is the self-
regulatory body for lawyers in the province of Ontario), at http://vwwv.lsuc.on.ca/services/
RulesProfCondpage-en.jsp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). The commentary following Rule
2.08 lists factors very similar to those that follow ABA Model Rule 1.5. The rule also warns
that fees are subject to an assessment under the Solicitors Act, which involves a substantive
review of a lawyer's fees by the LSUC if a complaint is filed by his client. See id. cmt.
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recover fees already paid.13' Rule 1.5 also applies when a disciplinary
authority attempts to discipline a lawyer for charging unreasonably
high fees.' 32 Courts are empowered to inquire about the reasonable-
ness of legal fees as part of their inherent authority to regulate the
practice of law.' 33
ABA Rule 1.5 sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts or
disciplinary bodies to consider when determining the reasonableness
of a fee.' 34 These factors include: the time, labor, and skills required;
fees customarily charged for similar legal services; the amount at
stake; the results obtained; the nature and length of the professional
relationship; the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyers in-
volved; the time limitations imposed by the client; and finally, whether
the fee is fixed or contingent. 135
The Restatement notes that the rules on reasonable fees address
three questions. 136 First, courts must assess whether the client made a
free and informed choice when entering into the fee arrangement. 137
The client's level of sophistication constitutes one relevant fact.138
Fees to which sophisticated clients have agreed are most often found
to be reasonable. 139 Another consideration is whether the lawyer of-
fered and explained alterative forms of billing to the client.' 40 A fee
paid in the form of real or personal property will attract special scru-
tiny because it raises questions concerning the valuation of both the
property and the services rendered, along with the lawyer's special
knowledge, if any, of the value of the property.141 In negotiating and
collecting fees, lawyers must meet duties of good faith and fair dealing
131 See, e.g., Pfeifer v. Sentry Ins., 745 F. Supp. 1434, 1443 (E.D. Wis. 1990) (explaining
that courts have the inherent power to refuse to enforce a legal services contract on the
basis of excessive or unreasonable fees); Drury v. Fawer, 590 So. 2d 808, 811 (La. Ct. App.
1991) (finding that that trial court has discretion to determine the value of legal services
rendered); Beatty v. NP Corp., 581 N.E.2d 1311, 1315 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991) (stating that
legal fee contracts are reviewed in light of lawyers' fiduciary duties to their clients).
132 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 34 cmt. a (2000).
133 See cases cited supra note 131.
134 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(a) (2000).
135 Id.
136 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWvYERs § 34 cmL c (2000).
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866, 875 (9th Cir.
1979) (enforcing a contract to pay high contingency fees on an important case against a
large corporation with inside legal counsel); Citizens Bank v. C. & H. Constr. & Paving Co.,
600 P.2d 1212, 1218 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979) (enforcing a large contingency fee
arrangement).
140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAwVYERs § 34 cmt. c (2000).
141 See id.
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to their clients because courts view lawyers as having substantially
greater bargaining power than their clients.1 42
Second, courts should consider whether the fee arrangement is
similar to what would be entered into by other lawyers in similar cir-
cumstances.1 43 The fairness of the fees at issue can be judged by com-
paring the hourly rates in question with the hourly rates of lawyers
with comparable skills, reputation, and experience. In the context of
contingency fee arrangements, courts often make comparisons be-
tween the percentage in question and the percentage charged by
other law firms for similar matters.144
Third, courts inquire into whether any events have taken place
subsequent to determining the fee that would make the fee unreason-
able. Reasonableness is normally assessed ex ante, at the time the con-
tract was entered into and with the information the parties had at that
time. 145 Under limited circumstances, however, subsequent events
may have a bearing on the reasonableness of the terms of an already
negotiated agreement. 146 For example, a fee may be unreasonable
after the fact if a lawyer has provided poor service, even if the fee
would have been viewed as reasonable for better quality service. 147
2. Regulation of Contingency Fees
Given the similarities between contingency fees and equity bill-
ing, a brief account of the regulation and reasonableness of contin-
gency fees is necessary.' 48 Contingency fees are expressly permitted
under ABA Model Rule 1.5 (c).149 Given the greater potential for con-
flicts of interest between lawyers and clients, the rules of professional
conduct regulate contingency fees to a greater extent than other fee
arrangements.150 ABA Model Rule 1.5 prohibits contingency fees
where the public interest is significantly undermined or the potential
for conflict of interest is deemed too great.1 5 1 For example, contin-
142 Morse v. Espeland, 696 P.2d 428, 430-31 (Mont. 1985) (noting the inequality that
exists between the attorney and client when bargaining over fees).
143 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAYkWERs § 34 cmt. c (2000).
144 See id.
145 See id.
146 See id.
147 See id. § 34.
148 See discussion supra Part II.C.
149 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2000).
150 See id. R. 1.5 cmt. 3.
151 See id. R. 1.5(d) (1)-(2).
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gency fees are prohibited in relation to the representation of defend-
ants in criminal cases,1 52 as well as in divorce and custody cases. 153
In situations in which contingency fees are permitted, they must
be in a written document that states the method by which the fee is to
be calculated. 54 The rules of professional conduct recognize that the
amount earned will exceed that produced by an hourly billing ar-
rangement, but note that the lawyer bears greater risk under the for-
mer arrangement. 155 Applying these principles, courts tend to find
contingency fees unreasonable in the following three circumstances:
when there is a high likelihood of recovery and thus a very low risk of
nonpayment;156 when a client has not been offered alternative billing
arrangements; 57 and when the percentage rate or the base to which it
is applied is excessive.' 58
3. Reasonableness Depends on Context
What constitutes a reasonable fee will vary with the circumstances
of each case and requires a fact-specific inquiry. A legal fee of $4 mil-
lion, constituting thirty-three percent of the plaintiffs recovery in a
derivative action, was found not to be unreasonable. 59 Similarly, a
152 Id. R. 1.5 (d) (2). The Reporters of the Restatement believe that the prohibition of
criminal contingent fees should be relaxed. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW Gov-
ERNING LAYvERs § 35 cmL f (2000). For criticism on the use of contingency fees in crimi-
nal cases, see WoI.rsAMi, supra note 34, § 9.4.3.
153 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (1) (2000). The traditional rationale
proffered for this rationale is that contingent fees in this context create incentives for
lawyers to discourage reconciliation and encourage adversarial proceedings. It has been
noted that the prohibition has a disproportional impact on women who are less propertied
or have less income so as to be able to pay a flat fee on a cash hourly basis. See HAZARD ET
Al., supra note 105, at 518-19. However, one could undermine the public interest in pre-
serving marriages by arguing that contingent fees are unnecessary in this context because
courts will readily assign reasonable legal fees from the propertied spouse to the non-prop-
ertied spouse's attorney. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWvYERs § 35
cmt. g (2000). This prohibition has been criticized. See id.
154 MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(c) (2000).
155 See, e.g., McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 823 F.2d 43, 48 (3d Cir. 1987) (explain-
ing that large contingency fee agreements are justified by the risk of non-recovery).
156 See, e.g., Redevelopment Comm'n v. Hyder, 201 S.E.2d 236, 239 (N.C. Ct. App.
1973) (holding that contingency fees are inappropriate where there is little to no risk of
nonpayment).
157 See, e.g., Comm. on Legal Ethics v. Tatterson, 352 S.E.2d 107, 113 (W. Va. 1986)
(stating that lawyers should fully explain the need for a particular fee arrangement to their
clients). A comment on ABA Model Rule 1.5 states: "When there is doubt whether a con-
tingent fee is consistent with the client's base interest, the lawyer should offer the client
alternative bases for the fee and explain their implications." MODEL RuLES OF PROF'L CON-
DUCT R. 1.5 cmt. 3 (2000).
158 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAw GOVERNING LAWYERS § 35 cmt. d (2000).
159 See Principe v. Ukropina (In re Pac. Enters. Sec. Litig.), 47 F.3d 373, 379 (9th Cir.
1995).
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
fee of $14.2 million arising from a $42 million settlement of a class
action securities litigation was found not to be unreasonable. 160
On the other hand, many court decisions have found fees to be
unreasonable. Lawyers who charge clients for getting up to speed in
an area may find that their fees are deemed unreasonable.1 6 1 Lawyers
who charge a high fee despite the lack of complexity of the work in-
volved may also find their fees to be unreasonable. In Kentucky Bar
Association v. Newberg, legal fees of forty-five percent of the recovery of
reparation benefits from an insurer were found to be excessive when
there was little prospect that the insurer would contest the claim.' 62
Also, collecting a contingency fee for monies recovered (but not
through settlement or litigation) may constitute an excessive fee, as in
the case of In re Gerard, where legal fees of over $150,000 were col-
lected for redeeming bank certificates through a simple administra-
tive process. 163
Although legal fees are not necessarily unreasonable even when
they exceed the client's recovery, 164 legal fees that leave the client
with no recovery will be viewed as being excessive. 165 Lack of propor-
tionality between the legal services performed and the result obtained
may also result in a finding of unreasonableness. 66 For example, the
Connecticut Bar Association's Committee on Professional Ethics ruled
that a legal fee of two percent of the sale price of the client's asset
could be unreasonable if it was not proportionate to the value of the
services rendered. 167
a. Opinions on Equity Billing
A 1998 Utah State Bar Opinion cites ABA Model Rule 1.5 and
states that the following additional factors should be considered in
relation to equity billing:
1) The liquidity of the client's stock; in particular, whether the cli-
ent's stock trades publicly at the time of the fee arrangement and if
160 See In re Crazy Eddie Sec. Litig., 824 F. Supp. 320, 326 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
161 See Norman v. Hous. Auth., 836 F.2d 1292, 1306 (11th Cir. 1988).
162 839 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1992).
163 548 N.E.2d 1051, 1057 (Ill. 1989).
164 See, e.g., W. Media, Inc. v. Merrick, 757 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Mont. 1988) (finding that
a $5,000 fee was not excessive, regardless of whether it exceeded the amount of recovery).
165 See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Hollander, 594 So. 2d 307, 307-08 (Fla. 1992) (holding that
retaining the entire amount of a settlement obtained on behalf of a client warrants forfei-
ture of excessive fees); McCrary v. McCrary, 764 P.2d 522, 525-26 (Okla. 1988) (holding
that a fee arrangement arearding the client's home to a lawyer for successful representation
in a single-asset divorce proceeding was an improper contingency arrangement).
166 See Comm. on Prof'1 Ethics, Conn. Bar Ass'n, Informal Op. 88-5 (1988), abstracted in
4 ABA/BNA LAwYRs' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr 106 (1988) [hereinafter LAw-
vERS' MANUAL].
167 Id.
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it does not, the risk that the client's stock will not be publicly traded
in the future;
2) The present and anticipated value of the client's stock including
the risk that a proposed patent or trademark may not be granted or
that necessary government approvals may not be received;
3) Whether the stock to be given to the law firm is subject to restric-
tions; and
4) The amount of the stock to be received by the law firm and
whether it will be able to exercise voting control over the client. 168
A formal opinion issued by the ABA Committee on Ethics and
Professional Responsibility in July 2000 ("ABA Opinion on Equity Bill-
ing") confirms that lawyers are not prohibited from acquiring an own-
ership interest in a client so long as they comply with Model Rule
1.5,169 but cites Professors Hazard and Hodes who caution that,
"[o]ne danger [to the lawyer who accepts stock as a fee is that the
business will] so prosper that the fee will later appear unreasonably
large for the work performed."170
The ABA Opinion on Equity Billing notes that determining rea-
sonableness involves making a difficult assessment of the market value
of the stock at the time the transaction is entered into.' 71 It recog-
nizes that the value of the stock may not be readily ascertainable, and
in such cases, "the percentage of stock agreed upon should reflect the
value, as perceived by the client and the lawyer at the time of the
transaction, that the legal services will contribute to the potential suc-
cess of the enterprise.' ' 72
A formal opinion issued by the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York's Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics in 2000
also expressly permits lawyers in some circumstances to accept shares
or other securities, including options, as compensation for the render-
ing of legal services, but states that the the fee realized by such an
arrangement may not be excessive.' 73 Interestingly, the opinion cau-
168 See Ethics Advisory Opinion Comm., Utah State Bar, Op. 98-13 (1998), abstracted in
[1996-2000] L WyRs' MAuAL, supra note 166, at 1101:8507, available at http://
vv.utahbar.org/opinions/html/98-13.html.
169 ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 00-418 (2000), reprinted
in [1996-2000] LA-vyRs' M ANUAL, supra note 166, at 1101:207 [hereinafter ABA Opinion
on Equity Billing].
170 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODEs, THE LAW OF LAiYERING § 1.8:202
(2d ed. Supp. 1998).
171 ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra note 169, at 1101:209.
172 See id. at 1101:210. The opinion states in a footnote that "[t]he committee is aware
that sometimes the lawyer will ask the corporation to issue her a percentage of the shares
initially issued to the founders as a condition to the lawyer agreeing to become counsel to
the new enterprise. We take no position on the ethical propriety of the practice." Id. at
1101:210 n.16.
173 Comm. on Prof l &Judicial Ethics, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y., Formal Op.
2000-3 (2000), abstracted in [1996-2000] LAWYERS' MANuAL, supra note 166, at 1101:6405
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tions that if a lawyer is discharged or withdraws from her representa-
tion of an equity-billed client, she would not be entitled to receive
more than the value of the work performed to the date of termination
of the representation. 174 The ABA Opinion on Equity Billing is more
flexible and favorable to lawyers, and states that they may keep the
equity "[ilf the client's understanding is that the lawyer keeps the
stock interest regardless of the amount of legal services performed by
the lawyer" and that understanding is clearly memorialized in the re-
tainer agreement. 175 Otherwise, a court may treat any stock they re-
ceived as an advance fee and require all or part of it to be returned if
the work originally contemplated has not been performed. 176
b. Application of Reasonableness to Equity Billing
As noted above, the value of Wilson Sonsini's stock in its client
WebVan increased by $51 million on the stock's first day of trading on
public markets.177 Wilson Sonsini had taken as compensation two mil-
lion shares in WebVan in addition to its hourly fees.178 Some would
argue that this fee was not reasonable. However, as noted above, the
reasonableness of a fee depends on many factors.
A number of issues are relevant to the analysis of whether equity
billing can be reconciled with reasonable-fee requirements. First, one
must determine whether the technology start-up's decision to enter
into the equity arrangement was free and informed. Under this crite-
rion, one would determine whether the client had been offered a
number of billing alternatives, of which equity was one option. If so,
this would imply that the client's decision was voluntary. However, as
illustrated by Wilson Sonsini, many top law firms that represent start-
ups, as a matter of course, request equity in addition to charging their
[hereinafter NYC Bar Formal Opinion], available at http://www.abcny.org/
eth2000.htm#20003.
174 Id. (citing Comm. on Prof'l & Judicial Ethics, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Formal Op. 1988-7 (1988)); NEw YORK CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106, DR 5-101,
DR 5-104, DR 5-105, EC 2-20, EC 2-24, EC 5-3, EC 5-13 (1999).
175 See ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra note 169, at 1101:211.
176 See, e.g., Ryan v. Butera, Beausang, Cohen & Brennan, P.C., 193 F.3d 210, 218 (3d
Cir. 1999) (noting that a lawyer's ethics may be questioned for failure to return the
"unearned" portion of the fee); see also In re Cooperman, 633 N.E.2d 1069, 1072 (N.Y.
1994) (noting that "the use of a special nonrefundable retainer fee agreement clashes with
public policy").
177 See supra text accompanying note 7.
178 See id. While Wilson Sonsini's equity in WebVan may have appreciated by $51 mil-
lion on its first day of trading, it was likely prohibited from realizing these gains because of
lock-up requirements. In fact, if Wilson Sonsini continued to hold the stock on July 9,
2001, the date on which WebVan announced that it would file for bankruptcy, the value of
its two million shares would have been worth just $120,000. WebVan closed at $0.06 per
share on Friday, July 6, 2001. See Webvan Shuts Down, at http://cnnfn.cnn.com/2001/07/
09/technology/webvan/index.htm. WebVan's initial public offering took place in Novem-
ber 1999 at a price of $15.00 per share. Id.
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standard hourly rates. This practice can be justified on the basis that
the equity represents a financing charge for deferring collection of
the client's account until its liquidity event. Furthermore, even when
the start-up client does not wish to give any equity to the law firm and
is willing to pay on a regular basis, the firm may argue that its willing-
ness to associate with the start-up provides the start-up with indirect
benefits (such as a positive signal to the marketplace) and that the
firm should be compensated accordingly.
The level of sophistication of the start-up's management team
and outside advisors is also relevant in determining whether it made a
fully informed decision in offering equity. One cannot generalize
whether technology start-ups as a class are sophisticated or unsophisti-
cated. As a starting point, the age, education, and business experi-
ence of the start-up's management team would have to be assessed. A
technology start-up can involve a group of twenty-somethings or it can
be comprised of serial entrepreneurs or other individuals who have
left traditional old-economy jobs in banking, consulting, or law. 179
A comparison of the equity arrangement in question with the eq-
uity arrangements of other law firms of comparable skill and reputa-
tion is another factor to consider. This analysis, however, should be
used with extreme caution and should not be viewed as determinative.
As has been noted in the tort context, an entire industry may fall be-
low the reasonable standard of care.'8 0 In a market which is not fully
competitive, the prices that other law firms charge for similar services
may only reflect what the market will bear and not what would be
considered reasonable. With this caveat aside, if most law firms are
charging their standard hourly rates in addition to one percent of the
client's equity, then a law firm that is charging standard hourly rates
along with a more significant equity stake, for example, five percent of
the client's equity, may have its fees scrutinized as being
unreasonable. 181
It is also possible that subsequent events can make an equity bill-
ing arrangement unreasonable. Generally speaking, the reasonable-
ness of an arrangement should be evaluated as of the time at which it
179 Serial entrepreneurs can be defined as individuals who have brought many ideas to
fruition and are working on their latest venture. Because of the recent technology
meltdown, a number of the managers who left old-economyjobs for start-ups are returning
to their previous existences. This phenomena has been coined "b2b" for "back to bank-
ing" and "b2c" for "back to consulting."
180 See Helling v. Carey, 519 P.2d 981, 983 (Wash. 1974), superseded by statute as stated in
579 P.2d 374, 376 (Wash. Ct. App. 1978); see also The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir.
1932) (Hand, J.) (noting that "a whole calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of
new and available devices").
181 There may be legitimate reasons for a higher fee, if, for example, the law firm in
question has such a prestigious reputation that the value of reputational bonding provided
by it is unusually valuable.
2001]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
is entered. 182 Even if a one percent equity interest ends up having a
value of $1 million on the first day of public trading, as a general
matter, reasonableness should still be assessed at the time the parties
made the arrangement. However, if a law firm takes equity and
charges standard hourly rates as a premium for the introduction to
venture capitalists, for example, then what if the start-up client, subse-
quent to entering into the equity arrangement with the law firm, ar-
ranges venture capital financing independent of the firm's assistance?
Could the equity fee be considered unreasonable under these circum-
stances because the contingency upon which the firm was supposed to
receive the equity fee did not occur? If the equity is compensation not
for the introduction to financing sources, but for the additional risk
that the firm bears by dealing with a client that is of lower financial
quality than that with which it normally deals, then, even if one per-
cent turns out to be $1 million, it is harder to make the argument that
the equity interest was unreasonable. Similarly, if the equity is com-
pensation for the firm's reputational bonding services, then the value
provided by it is much more indirect. In other words, even if the
firm's contacts did not provide the client with financing, its associa-
tion with the start-up was of great assistance in the securing of financ-
ing. Given that reasonableness will depend upon the purpose for
which equity was issued to the law firm, it is in the interests of both
firms and their clients to specify in a written contract the exact bases
for its issuance and under what circumstances, if any, it must be
returned.183
B. Business Transactions Between Lawyers and Clients
The acquisition of a client's stock by a lawyer in lieu of cash is
considered a business transaction between a lawyer and her client that
is governed by fiduciary obligations and various rules adopted by bar
associations. 8 4 Lawyers are held to high standards by courts when
they review business transactions with clients. In In re Lowther, the Mis-
souri supreme court stated that becoming personally involved with the
affairs of clients "is an area wrought with pitfalls and traps and the
Court is without choice other than to hold the attorney to the highest
of standards under such circumstance. '" 18 5
182 See NYC Bar Formal Opinion, supra note 173.
183 Law firms would likely insist on listing all of the above-noted factors in a written fee
arrangement, given that they are so open-textured.
184 See Geraghty, supra note 122, at 21; see also ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra
note 169.
185 611 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Mo. 1981) (per curiam). Some cases, such as In re Neville, 708 P.2d
1297 (Ariz. 1985), come close to suggesting that any substantial transaction between a law-
yer and her client may be voidable at the client's option. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 105, at
565.
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ABA Model Rule 1.8 permits business transactions between law-
yers and clients provided that: (1) the transaction and its terms are
fair and reasonable to the client; (2) the transaction has been fully
disclosed in writing; (3) the client has been given a reasonable oppor-
tunity to seek independent legal advice; and (4) the client consents to
transaction in writing.186 Courts have sanctioned lawyers for not com-
plying with the requirements of ABA Model Rule 1.8 in a variety of
business dealings with clients.1 87
The current commentary following ABA Model Rule 1.8 makes
no reference to equity billing. The Ethics 2000 Commission of the
ABA has proposed amendments to Rule 1.8 to acknowledge and regu-
late the growing trend toward equity billing.188 The proposed com-
mentary section on Rule 1.8 would clarify that accepting equity in lieu
of cash is a business transaction which must meet written disclosure,
consent, and fairness requirements. 89 The Ethics 2000 Commission
has proposed to amend Rule 1.8 to require that a lawyer not only give
his client the opportunity to seek independent legal advice, but also
must advise the client in writing to do so. 190 Also, the client's consent
must be "informed" and relate not only to the transaction but also to
"the lawyer's role in the transaction." 19'
186 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUcT R. 1.8 (2000). LSUC's rule on conflicts of inter-
est, although more generally framed than ABA Model Rule 1.8, is applicable to equity
billing transactions. LSUC Rule 2.04(3) provides: "A lawyer shall not act or continue to act
in a matter when there is or is likely to be a conflicting interest unless, after disclosure
adequate to make an informed decision, the client or prospective client consents." See
LSUC RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.04(3) (2001), available at http://www.lsuc.on.ca/
services/RulesProfCondpage en.jsp (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). A conflict of interest is de-
fined as an interest "that would be likely to affect adversely a lawyer's judgment on behalf
of, or loyalty to, a client or prospective client." Id. R. 2.04(1) (a). The commentary follow-
ing Rule 2.04(1) states that a conflict of interest would exist if a lawyer, a family member,
or a law partner had a personal financial interest in a client's affairs. See id. cmt. Lawyers
who call LSUC's Practice Advisory Service are informed that equity billing is not contrary
per se to the Rules of Professional Conduct, but are advised to follow several safeguards to
avoid a conflict of interest. Telephone Interview with Professional Advisory Services of
LSUC (May 24, 2000). It recommends that the billing agreement be in writing and that it
expressly state that legal services are being exchanged for shares. Id. The service also
suggests that a negotiated value be assigned to the shares in the agreement so that at the
time they are accepted in lieu of cash, there is no dispute as to their worth. Id. In addi-
tion, lawyers are advised to inform their clients to seek independent legal advice on the
merits of the billing arrangements. Id.
187 See, e.g., In re Cordova-Gonzalez, 996 F.2d 1334 (1st Cir. 1993) (disbarring a lawyer
for borrowing money from a client without disclosing ownership of property pledged as
collateral and bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over collateral); Fla. Bar v. Loebl, 526 So. 2d
65 (Fla. 1988) (disbarring attorney for use of client funds to satisfy personal obligations
and failure to reimburse client); HAZARD ET AL., supra note 105, at 562-65.
188 See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (Discussion Draft 2000), available at
http://wv.abanet.org/cpr/e2k-reporthome.html.
189 See id. cmt.
190 See id. R 1.8.
191 Id.
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The ABA Opinion on Equity Billing notes that a transaction
should not be viewed automatically as being "fair and reasonable to
the client" under Rule 1.8(a) even if a fee is found to be "reasonable"
under Rule 1.5(a). 192 The Opinion provides that to grant full disclo-
sure consistent with Rule 1.8(a), a lawyer must explain the potential
effects of the equity billing arrangement on the client-lawyer relation-
ship including the potential for conflicts between the lawyer's self-in-
terest and his client's best interests.193 The opinion also states that a
lawyer must advise his client in writing to seek the advice of indepen-
dent legal counsel and must give his client a reasonable opportunity
to do so. 19 4
A billing agreement may be unenforceable by a law firm if it has
not strictly complied with the procedural requirements discussed
above. In Passante v. McWilliam,'95 Passante, a lawyer, arranged for a
$100,000 loan that was essential to the survival of his client, the Upper
Deck Company. 196 Upper Deck's board of directors agreed to com-
pensate Passante by giving him three percent of the company's eq-
uity. 19 7 The company became successful and Passante's shares
became worth $33 million, but the board refused to honor the agree-
ment.198 The trial judge set aside ajury verdict of $33 million and the
dismissal was upheld on appeal on the grounds that Passante did not
advise his client of the need for independent legal advice. 199 The
court reasoned that the board might have negotiated a flat finder's
fee for Passante had he advised them to obtain independent legal
advice.200
Passante highlights that even though an equity billing arrange-
ment may be fair and reasonable in substance to a client, courts are
willing to impose penalties on law firms that do not comply with pro-
cedural requirements in order to create the proper incentives for
compliance by other law firms. 201
On the issue of independent legal advice, it is significant to note
that the ethical rules do not require the client to obtain independent
192 ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra note 169, at 1101:209.
193 Id. at 1101:210.
194 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8 (1983); see also Gwyneth E. McAlpine,
Comment, Getting a Piece of the Action: Should Lawyers Be Allowed to Invest in Their Clients'
Stock?, 47 UCLA L. REv. 549 (1999) (analyzing this ethical issue).
195 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (Ct. App. 1997).
196 See id. For an analysis of the case, see HAzARD ET AL., supra note 105, at 562-63.
197 Passante, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 298-99.
198 Id. at 299.
199 Id. at 302.
200 See id.
201 See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic The-
ory of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87, 91 (1989).
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legal advice, only that his lawyer advise him to do so. 2 0 2 The reality is
that many technology start-up clients are financially constrained from
obtaining independent legal advice. If the client does go to another
law firm, it will also have to give that law firm equity, creating a never-
ending domino effect due to which the client does not actually end up
receiving what the ethical rules would consider to be independent le-
gal advice.
There is also the problem of hindsight bias. Even though ethical
rules require that the fairness and reasonableness of the transaction
between the lawyer and client be assessed ex ante-at the time the
parties entered into the arrangement and with the information they
had at the time-judges will often take into account the actual large
payout to the lawyer without taking into account the extremely low
probability of its occurrence. 20 3
Ethical and fiduciary rules for business transactions with clients
are not inconsistent with the statutory provisions and common-law
principles governing self-dealing transactions between other types of
fiduciaries and the individuals or entities to whom they owe duties.
For example, similar rules currently exist in the context of directors
who engage in self-dealing transactions with corporations on whose
boards they sit.204 While the strict Anglo-American common-law rule
prohibited directors from entering into such transactions (even if the
transactions were fair to the corporation), the current general rule
recognizes the potential gains that may arise from such contracts. As
such, the current rule allows business transactions to be consummated
between directors and corporations if the director makes full disclo-
sure of his interest in the transaction, and either a majority of disinter-
202 See MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(a) (2000).
203 Similar problems have arisen when judges have reviewed the large contingency fees
lawyers have received from the settlement of tobacco litigation. See, e.g., State v. Am. To-
bacco Co., 772 So. 2d 417 (Ala. 2000).
204 Justice Cardozo pronounced the classic formulation of the obligations of corporate
fiduciaries in Meinhard v. Salmon:
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is
held to something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not hon-
esty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the
standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is un-
bending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty
by the "disintegrating erosion" of particular exceptions. Only thus has the
level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trod-
den by the crowd.
164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, C.J.) (citation omitted). For an example of a
more permissive rule, see N.Y. Bus. CoR". LNw § 713(a) (McKinney 1986), which states
that "[n]o contract or other transaction between a corporation and one or more of its
directors... shall be either void or voidable" solely on the basis of a conflict of interest.
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ested directors or shareholders approve the transaction, or the terms
of the transaction are fair and reasonable to the corporation. 20 5
C. Continuing Conflicts of Interest Between Lawyers and Clients
The general rule on conflicts of interest, set out in ABA Model
Rule 1.7(b), states that a lawyer "shall not represent a client if the
representation of that client may be materially limited by... the law-
yer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the rep-
resentation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents
after consultation."20 6
In general, equity billing can be seen as aligning the interests of
law firms and their clients. The ABA Opinion on Equity Billing pro-
vides that "[a] lawyer's representation of a corporation in which she
owns stock creates no inherent conflict of interest under Rule 1.7"
because "management's role primarily is to enhance the business's
value for the stockholders .... [and t]he lawyer's legal services in as-
sisting management usually will be consistent with the lawyer's stock
ownership. '20 7 The benefits that arise from the convergence of law-
yers' and clients' interests have already been discussed in detail in Part
1.208
However, circumstances may arise where equity billing could lead
to a conflict between a client's best interests and his lawyer's self-inter-
est. In other words, equity billing could impair a lawyer's ability to
exercise independent professionaljudgment. As one lawyer stated: "A
lawyer holding stock in a client company ... could be tempted to
discourage the company from taking a necessary step because it might
hurt the stock's prospects." 20 9 Yet another said: "[a]s a lawyer you
might be thinking to give cautious advice. As an entrepreneur you
might be more of a risk taker."210 Sullivan & Cromwell, second only
to Wilson Sonsini in the number of IPOs that it handled in 1999, ref-
205 See Am. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE § 5.02 (1994). Most
states have statutory provisions governing self-dealing transactions between directors and
corporations. Some states have slightly different requirements for self-interested contracts
to pass scrutiny. See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713 (requiring disclosure of any financial
interest and approval by a disinterested board or shareholders).
206 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2000). LSUC Rule 2.04(3) contains a
similar provision. See supra note 186.
207 ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra note 169, at 1101:212.
208 Two practitioners even go as far as suggesting that if a lawyer is unwilling to invest
his own money in the start-up, then the investment of time, which is money to a lawyer,
should itself be questioned. See Katz & Savarino, supra note 61.
209 Sean Somerville, Lawyers Stocking Up on Payday, SUN (Baltimore), Nov. 7, 1999, at
ID.
210 See Goodman, supra note 75.
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uses to hold stock in clients, and cites potential conflicts as the ratio-
nale for the policy.211 Several possible conflicts are highlighted below.
1. Conflicts Between the Best Interests of the Corporation and Those
of Minority Shareholders
The doctrines of corporate law require that directors and officers
act in the best interests of the corporation.21 2 This means not only
acting in the best interests of a majority of shareholders but the corpo-
ration as a whole. Thus, when a lawyer advises the directors and of-
ficers of a corporation, she must give advice that is in the best interests
of the corporation as a whole. An argument can be made that by
holding a minority interest in a corporation, a lawyer's judgment may
be compromised in favor of the interests of the minority shareholders
to the detriment of majority shareholders or the corporation as a
whole.
2. Conflicts Between Shareholders and Creditors
The judiciary has also developed the principle that directors owe
fiduciary duties to a corporation's creditors when the business nears
insolvency, and has recognized that directors may engage in opportu-
nistic behavior at such times to the detriment of creditors.213 In Credit
Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.. v. Pathe Communications Corp.,2 14 Chan-
cellor Allen wrote that "[ait least where a corporation is operating in
the vicinity of insolvency, a board of directors is not merely the agent
of the residue risk bearers, but owes its duty to the corporate enter-
prise."2 15 In an often-quoted footnote to the judgment, he continued,
"[t] he possibility of insolvency can do curious things to incentives, ex-
posing creditors to risks of opportunistic behavior."21 6 Conceivably, a
law firm holding a minority equity interest in a client that is near insol-
vency may face a conflict between its self-interest as a shareholder and
its duty to advance the superior legal interests of creditors.
211 See Osborne, supra note 35, at 83.
212 See Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 681-82 (Mich. 1919); see also AM. LAW
INST., supra note 205, § 2.01 (a) ("[A] corporation should have as its objective the conduct
of business activities with a view to enhancing corporate profit and shareholder gain.")
(citation omitted); N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAw § 102(4) (McKinney 1986) (defining "corpora-
tion" as a "corporation for profit").
213 See, e.g., FDIC v. Sea Pines Co., 692 F.2d 973, 976-77 (4th Cir. 1982) ("[When the
corporation becomes insolvent, the fiduciary duty of the directors shifts from the stock-
holders to the creditors."); Clarkson Co. v. Shaheen, 660 F.2d 506, 512 (2d Cir. 1981)
(noting the policy of preserving the assets of insolvent corporations for their creditors).
214 Civ. A. No. 12150, 1991 WL 277613 (Del. Ch. 1991).
215 Id. at *34.
216 Id. at *36 n.55.
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3. Conflicts Between Shareholders and Other Constituencies
Corporate constituency statutes enacted in many states allow (and
in some cases require) directors to consider the interests of constitu-
encies other than shareholders when making decisions.21 7 Although
the State of Delaware has not enacted such a statute, judicial decisions
rendered by the Delaware courts allow boards to consider the interests
of non-shareholder stakeholders so long as the non-shareholder inter-
ests are not inconsistent with the interests of shareholders. 218 Thus,
directors may have a reasonable regard for the interests of employees,
consumers, suppliers, and the local community, for example. One
could argue that in situations in which a lawyer is also a shareholder,
she will not be able to consider the interests of other stakeholders
properly if it is detrimental to her own position as a shareholder.
4. Conflicts Between Majority and Minority Shareholders in Closely
Held Corporations
A law firm that has an equity interest in a client when negotiating
a shareholders' agreement may also find itself in a conflict-of-interest
situation. It is not uncommon for minority shareholders in private
corporations to negotiate exit options for themselves with the majority
shareholder. A law firm that holds a five-percent equity interest in a
client that wants to negotiate an exit option by requiring the majority
shareholder to buy its stake may find itself in a conflict between its
self-interests and advising the majority shareholder on its best
interests.
5. Conflicts in Dealings with Venture Capitalists
Other conflicts may also arise in the context of start-ups that ob-
tain financing from venture capitalists. Lawyers holding equity in
their clients may, as a general matter, negotiate less rigorously and
217 See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 60, at 195 (explaining that a number of states have
enacted statutes that allow consideration of non-shareholder interests). For a discussion of
to whom the fiduciary duties of corporate managers run, see E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For
Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1145 (1932). Cf A.A. Berle, Jr.,
Note, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HAv. L. REv. 1365 (1932). Since
the early 1980s, several states have enacted shareholder statutes that allow or require direc-
tors to consider the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders in making decisions. See
generally Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 14 (1992) (examining the debate about the proper interpretation of corpo-
rate constituency statutes); John C. Alexander et al., Note, Nonshareholder Constituency Stat-
utes and Shareholder Wealth: A Note, 21J. BANKING & FIN. 417 (1997). For a lucid criticism of
stakeholder statutes, see Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for
Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. Rxv.
23 (1991).
218 See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
1986) ("A board may have regard for various constituencies in discharging its responsibili-
ties, provided there are rationally related benefits accruing to the stockholders.").
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give marginally more favorable terms to venture capitalists to ensure
that the client obtains financing. Alternatively, law firms may be
tempted to withhold adverse financial information from venture capi-
talists on the basis that the revelation may terminate the deal.219
6. Conflicts with Serial Entrepreneurs
A law firm representing a technology start-up founded by serial
entrepreneurs (individuals who in the past have developed technol-
ogy-related ideas, brought them to a liquidity event, cashed out, and
have now started a new project) may find itself in a conflict when it
negotiates with venture capitalists over the terms of the entrepre-
neurs' continued association with the start-up. It is often in a com-
pany's best interest to maintain a longer rather than shorter
association with its founders. The firm and entrepreneurs, however,
may find it in their self-interests to negotiate a more limited associa-
tion so that the entrepreneurs can be free to work on their next ven-
ture, in which the firm expects involvement and therefore an equity
interest.
7. Conflicts in Representation of Competitors
Lawyers who engage in equity billing may be constrained in rep-
resenting competitors of equity-billed clients. 220 Under circumstances
such as those described above, compliance with ABA Model Rule
1.7(b) requires a lawyer to self-evaluate her ability to subordinate her
self-interest in favor of her client's best interests. 22' Even after this
self-assessment, a lawyer must obtain her client's informed consent.
8. Comparison of Equity Billing with Compensating Managers and
Directors with Equity
Notably the potential conflicts indicated above are not dissimilar
from the conflicts that can arise when corporations compensate man-
agers and directors through stock. A significant component of the
compensation of managers of North American corporations includes
stock grants and stock options in addition to a cash base salary.222
Similarly, outside directors of many corporations in the United States
are also compensated through stock grants and stock options of the
219 See ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra note 169, at 1101:212.
220 See, e.g., Cash? How Old Economy, supra note 10, at 68. Stewart Alsop, a general
partner at New Enterprise Associates, sees no conflict-of-interest problem with lawyers in-
vesting in start-ups, but does warn against representing a company and its competitor. See
Neidorf, supra note 37, at 37.
221 ABA Opinion on Equity Billing, supra note 169, at 1101:213.
222 See Gary Strauss, Corporate Directors Reaping More Stock, Cash, USA TODAY, June 8,
1999, at B1.
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companies on whose boards they sit.223 The National Association of
Corporate Directors' Blue Ribbon Commission Report on Director
Compensation recommended, as one of its best practices, "paying di-
rectors exclusively in cash and equity, with equity comprising a signifi-
cant portion of overall director pay."224
The benefit of such arrangements is that stock-based compensa-
tion aligns the interests of managers and directors with those of share-
holders.225 However, managers and outside directors who hold
minority equity positions may find themselves in conflict-of-interest sit-
uations similar to those faced by law firms. While these conflicts may
exist, the relevant issue is how much conflict should be accepted, or at
least tolerated, in light of the benefits of managers, directors, and law
firms holding stock in the companies they work for or represent.226
IV
LAWYERS AS GATEKEEPERS TO THE SECURITIES MARKET
The purpose of securities regulation is to protect investors and
ensure the efficient functioning of capital markets. 227 In this context,
the securities lawyer specifically is perceived to play a special
"gatekeeping" role in the enforcement of securities laws. For exam-
ple, the SEC itself has repeatedly noted that "the task of enforcing the
securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bar's shoul-
ders."2 28 One SEC Commissioner even stated on the record that "in
securities matters (other than those where advocacy is clearly proper)
the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of the
auditor than to that of an advocate." 229 The courts have agreed: "In
our complex society the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opin-
ion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than
223 See Gary Strauss, Forget Brass Rings-Execs Grab for Gold USA TODAY, June 15, 2001,
at Bi.
224 Dan R. Dalton & Catherine M. Daily, Directors and Shareholders as Equity Partners?
Handle with Care!, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS REv., Jan. 1, 1999, at 73, 75. In 1990, only 6%
of companies included stock as part of the compensation for directors whereas, in 1997,
84% of companies granted stock-based compensation to their directors. Id.
225 See KEVIN J. MURPHY, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 54 (Soc. Sci. Research Network,
Working Paper, 1998), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/delivery.cfm/
99051113.pdPabstractid=163914.
226 For an analysis of auditor independence, see Lawrence J. Fox, Dan's World: A Free
Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 Bus. LAw. 1533 (2000).
227 DAVID JOHNSTON & KATHLEEN DOYLE ROCKWELL, CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION
2 (2d ed. 1998); Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 64; ALAN B. PALMITER, SECURITIES REGULA-
TION: EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS (1998); LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3 (4th ed. 1999).
228 Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 1199.
229 Id. at 1200; see also PALMITER, supra note 227, at 371 ("Securities lawyers act as the
conscience of the securities industry, structuring and channeling client desires to fit regu-
latory prescriptions.... But, just as the superego carries guilt, the lawyer's role as con-
science carries responsibility.").
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the chisel or the crowbar."230 Given this pervasive perception, one
must ask whether accepting equity in a client impairs a lawyer's ability
to act as a gatekeeper to the securities market. Examination of the
economic theory of gatekeeping, as well as the relation between secur-
ities regulation and its enforcement mechanisms, permits a meaning-
ful analysis of this issue.
A. Economic Theory of Gatekeeping
There are many ways to detect, monitor, and punish wrongdoing.
Using the typical enforcement strategy of first-party liability, the initia-
tor of the wrongdoing is punished, resulting in deterrence and/or
internalization of the costs of the misconduct.23 ' When this strategy is
ineffective because, for example, wrongdoers are not sufficiently capi-
talized to pay the large fines imposed on them and thus do not inter-
nalize their wrongdoing, third-party liability may supplement it. 2 32
Third-party liability is criminal or tort liability which is imposed
on a party who, although not an initiator of wrongdoing, is neverthe-
less able either to deter it or force the internalization of its costs.233
Third-party liability can come in the form of strict or duty-based liabil-
ity. Strict third-party liability regimes include employers' vicarious lia-
bility for employees' tortious or criminal misconduct under the
doctrine of respondeat superior.2 34 Duty-based third-party liability re-
gimes include criminal liability for aiding and abetting wrongdoing
and liability for negligently failing to detect misconduct.235
A gatekeeping regime is an ex ante indirect enforcement
method. "Gatekeeping liability" is defined as a regime that imposes a
duty on a private third party to monitor for misconduct and to with-
230 United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J.).
231 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE LJ. 857 (1984); Kraakman, supra note 11.
232 See Kraakman, supra note 231; Kraakman, supra note 11.
233 See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523 (1984); Kraakman,
supra note 11.
234 See generally Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liabil-
ity, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833 (1994) (analyzing corporate criminal liability rules); C.Y. Cyrus
Chu & Yingyi Qian, Vicarious Liability Under a Negligence Rule, 15 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 305
(1994) (arguing for a lower level of vicarious liability); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of
Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE LJ. 1231 (1984) (developing economic principles to analyze
vicarious liability); Note, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law ofAgency, 91
YALE LJ. 168 (1981) (analyzing vicarious liability).
235 See Kraakman, supra note 11. Whistleblowing is another liability strategy that could
be imposed on third parties. See generally Robert Howse & Ronald J. Daniels, Rewarding
Whistleblowers: The Costs and Benefits of an Incentive-Based Compliance Strategy, in CoRPoRATE
DECISION-MAMNG IN CANADA 525 (RonaldJ. Daniels & Randall Morck eds., 1995); William
E. Kovacic, Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29
Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1799 (1996).
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hold support once misconduct is detected.236 The wrongdoer cannot
misbehave without the gatekeeper's involvement. 237
Many conditions must exist for an effective gatekeeping regime.
First, the wrongdoer needs to be screened through a gate.238 Some
entry point must exist through which he must pass in order to commit
the misconduct. If the wrongdoer can find another route whereby the
gatekeeper is avoided, then this regime will be ineffective. Second,
the gatekeeper must be the only individual who is able to open the
latch on the gate. The wrongdoer must not be able to open it on his
own. Third, the gatekeeper must have some influence over the
wrongdoer.2 39 If successive gatekeepers can be hired and fired at the
will of the wrongdoer until a gatekeeper is found who does not detect
or is willing to ignore the misconduct, the gatekeeping regime will be
ineffective. For example, securities laws attempt to prevent opinion
shopping by registrants for this purpose. When an auditor resigns or
is dismissed, securities laws require that the registrant disclose
whether, in the last two years, the auditor and the registrant had any
disagreements about the registrant's financial affairs and whether the
auditor's report contained adverse or qualified opinions.240 Fourth,
and perhaps most important, gatekeepers must be outsiders who value
their reputations and professional duties more than any potential gain
they may derive from the wrongdoer's misconduct.241
Outsider status is so crucial because only then can a combination
of economic and non-economic incentives prevent gatekeepers from
involving themselves in misconduct.242 Because the wrongdoer is only
one of the gatekeeper's many clients, the benefit gained by assisting
the wrongdoer will generally be outweighed by the threat of liability
and harm to the gatekeeper's reputation, because either would result
in a loss of income from other clients. 243 This factor is the most im-
portant for an effective gatekeeping regime:
Despite their disparate roles, moveover, it is easy to see why
outside directors, accountants, lawyers, and underwriters are likely
targets for a gatekeeper liability strategy .... [M]ost important,
each is an outsider with a career and assets beyond the firm. At the
very least, these potential gatekeepers face incentives that differ sys-
236 Kraakman, supra note 231, at 889.
237 See id. at 891.
238 See id
239 See id. at 890.
240 See id. at 892 n.105.
241 See id. at 892-93. For more on the role of reputation, rather than liability, in creat-
ing a gatekeeping regime, see Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based
Proposa4 88 CAL. L. REV. 279 (2000); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to Re-
place Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L. REv. 925 (1999).
242 See Kraakman, supra note 231, at 891.
243 See id.
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tematically from those of inside managers; in the usual case, they
are likely to have less to gain and more to lose from firm delicts
than inside managers. Indeed, gatekeeper liability can jeopardize
not only the personal interests of individual lawyers and account-
ants, but also the larger interests and reputations of their respective
firms or even of their entire professions.
... Outsiders will be more reluctant than managers to risk per-
sonal liability on the firm's behalf. Thus, if these gatekeepers can
detect offenses, it will be difficult-or at least very costly-to entice
them into a conspiracy.244
Alternatively, assisting the wrongdoer may simply be wrong according
to the gatekeeper's moral, ethical, or professional code. In this con-
text, it is not surprising that the roles that lawyers play in a wide variety
of contexts have attracted much attention from scholars interested in
the economic theory of gatekeeping. 245 Professor Gilson has noted
that litigators act as gatekeepers for clients who may wish to pursue
frivolous litigation.2 46 As another example, Professors Jackson and
Wilkins, writing separately about the savings and loan crisis, have
noted that lawyers acted as gatekeepers for clients who wanted to
thwart government investigation. 247 As yet another example, Profes-
sor Kraakman has noted that corporate and securities lawyers act as
gatekeepers when clients attempt to engage in illegal transactions that
require a legal opinion letter as a condition of closing.248 The sheer
diversity of literature on the subject reflects the breadth of opportuni-
ties that lawyers have to monitor and deter misconduct on the part of
others.
B. Gatekeepers in Securities Markets
Outside directors, accountants, and lawyers act as gatekeepers to
the securities market.2 49 Each kind of gatekeeper has its own "key":
244 Id. (footnote omitted). Item 304 of Form 8-K attempts to deter "opinion shop-
ping." See Loss & SELIGMAN, supra note 64, at 143-44.
245 For gatekeeping in the context of multidisciplinary firms, see Peter C. Kostant,
Breeding Better Watchdogs: Multidisciplinary Partnerships in Corporate Legal Practice, 84 MINN. L.
REv. 1213 (2000). For the role of lawyers as gatekeepers in the context of contingency fees
for criminal cases, see Pamela S. Karlan, Contingent Fees and Criminal Cases, 93 COLUM. L.
REv. 595 (1993); and David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers, 105 HAtv. L. REv. 801
(1992).
246 See Gilson, supra note 48.
247 See Howell E. Jackson, Reflections on Kaye, Scholer: Enlisting Lawyers to Improve the Regu-
lation of Financial Institutions, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1019 (1993); David B. Wilkins, Making
Context Count: Regulating Lawyers after Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 1145 (1993).
248 See Kraakman, supra note 11, at 58.
249 With respect to first-party liability, securities laws can impose significant criminal
and civil liability on issuers of securities. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, the
main anti-fraud provision, prohibits the use of "any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
in connection with the offer or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 7 7 q (1994). Issuers of securi-
ties are subject to criminal and civil liability for fraud under Rule lob-5, civil liability in the
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outside directors must sign off on securities transactions, 250 account-
ants must certify financial statements, 251 and lawyers are called upon
to provide legal opinions.252 Many securities transactions require a
lawyer's legal opinion that the transaction does not violate securities
laws. 253 A brief account of secondary liability imposed on lawyers as
third-party gatekeepers in the securities market is set out below.
1. Aiding and Abetting Liability
Lawyers and other gatekeepers who advise "securities swindlers"
in relation to a securities offering may be subject to criminal and civil
aiding-and-abetting liability under Rule lOb-5. 254 In SEC v. National
Student Marketing Corp.,255 the SEC took the position that the lawyers
in question should be subject to liability for failing to stop a merger
from proceeding even though the accountants had advised them that
the proxy documents contained misleading financial information.256
In the face of the false financial information, the lawyers for each
party to the transaction gave favorable legal opinions that the regis-
trant had not violated any federal or state laws to the knowledge of
counsel.257 The court held that the lawyers were liable for aiding and
abetting the fraud of the registrant.258
case of fraudulent registration statements under section 11, civil liability for noncompli-
ance with registration requirements under section 12(a) (1), and civil liability for a mis-
statement or omission in connection with the offer or sale of securities in section 12 (a) (2).
See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 270, 283, 300-03.
250 See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 102.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See PALMITER, supra note 227, at 371.
254 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). The rule states, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful ...
(a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made ... not
misleading, or
(c) [t]o engage in any act, practice, or course of business which oper-
ates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection
with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
255 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
256 Id. at 712-14.
257 See Richard W. Painter, Toward a Market for Lawyer Disclosure Services: In Search of
Optimal Whistleblowing Rules, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 221, 236 n.61 (1995). The SEC took
the position that, in addition to not participating in the misconduct and trying to dissuade
the client from committing the wrong, lawyers must inform the SEC of the client's inten-
tion to violate securities laws. See id. at 233, The SEC's position is starkly different from
lawyers' responsibilities under professional ethical rules. The ABA Model Rules permit
(rather than require) a lawyer to disclose client confidences only when the lawyer believes
imminent death or substantial bodily harm is likely. Id. at 227 n.20.
258 See Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 715.
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In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank,259 however, the U.S. Su-
preme Court rejected aiding-and-abetting liability for secondary par-
ticipants in private lOb-5 actions. 260 In a 5-4 decision, the Court held
that Rule 10b-5 defendants must engage in actual fraudulent behav-
ior, as opposed to simply providing secondary assistance. 261 The re-
sult of the decision is that Rule lOb-5 only reaches primary violators
who make false or misleading statements that induce investors to
trade to their detriment.262
Because Central Bank eliminates Rule 10b-5 liability for lawyers
and other gatekeepers on the basis that they are secondary partici-
pants, some subsequent lower court decisions have recharacterized ac-
countants, lawyers, and underwriters as primary violators for their role
in drafting, editing, and reviewing disclosure documents that contain
misrepresentations, so as to subject them to Rule lOb-5 liability.263
In addition, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
("Reform Act") 2 6 4 expressly authorizes the SEC to seek injunctive re-
lief or monetary damages from those who aid or abet a Rule lOb-5
violator by knowingly giving "substantial assistance. '265 Although the
Reform Act does not define substantial assistance, older case law sug-
gests that substantial assistance is established if investors relied on a
securities professional's reputation when investing, and that profes-
sional remained silent in the face of the client's perpetration of
fraud.2 66
2. Section 11: Liability for Misrepresentations in Registration
Statements
Section 11 of the Securities Act267 creates a civil remedy for pur-
chasers of a registered offering if they can prove a material misrepre-
sentation or omission in the registration statement.26 Section 11
defendants, who are jointly and severally liable, include traditional
primary wrongdoers such as issuers, chief executives, and financial
and accounting officers. 269 Significantly, section 11 also imposes lia-
259 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
260 Id. at 177.
261 Id.
262 See id. at 191.
263 See, e.g., Dannenberg v. PaineWebber Inc. (In re Software Toolswork, Inc. Sec. Li-
fig.), 50 F.3d 615, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a reasonable factfinder could find
that underwriters know or should have known of fraud in quarterly statements, and that
accountant's letters to SEC made false statements).
264 Pub. L. 104-67, § 104, 109 Stat. 737, 757 (1995).
265 See 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
266 See Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646, 652-53 (9th Cir. 1988).
267 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
268 PALmrait, supra note 227, at 164-71.
269 Id.
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bility on third-party gatekeepers such as outside directors, underwrit-
ers, and experts including accountants, lawyers, and engineers who
consented to the use of their opinion in the registration statement.270
Section 11 defendants need not be in privity with the purchasers of
the securities and need not have created or distributed the
misrepresentations. 271
Escott v. BarChris Construction Corp.2 72 is the leading case on Sec-
tion 11 due diligence defenses. Experts such as lawyers who prepare
legal opinions with respect to the legality of a transaction and ac-
countants who prepare or certify financial statements must show that
they conducted a reasonable investigation and had reasonable
grounds to believe that the portions of the registration statements
upon which they commented were true and not misleading.273 Igno-
rance is not an excuse for experts.2 74 Non-experts such as directors
can rely on an expert's opinion so long as they have no reason to
believe the information is false.275
3. Section 12: Liability for Selling Unregistered Securities Without an
Exemption
Under section 12(a) (1) of the Securities Act, a person who offers
or sells unregistered securities without an available exemption can be
held civilly liable. 276 A purchaser may not recover from an issuer or
any other seller unless there is a direct link between the purchaser
and the seller, a requirement that potentially limits gatekeeper liabil-
ity under section 12(a) (1).277 However, in Pinter v. Dah4278 the Su-
preme Court held that Congress intended to define "seller" broadly
for purposes of section 12(a) (1), and that those who solicit the pur-
chasers of securities in any capacity can be held liable under the provi-
sion.2 79 Consequently, an underwriter, lawyer, accountant, or outside
director who in any way solicits a purchase can be subject to section
12(a) (1) liability.
Section 12(a) (2) provides that any person who offers or sells a
security by means of a material misstatement or omission is liable to
the purchaser.2 0 While the Pinter Court explicitly stated that it was
270 Id.
271 See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 245-46.
272 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
273 Id. at 682-84.
274 See id. at 683.
275 See PALMITER, supra note 227, at 166; SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at
246.
276 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
277 See SODERQUISr & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 270.
278 486 U.S. 622 (1988).
279 Id. at 653; see also SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227 (analyzing Pinter).
280 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 283.
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his client is engaged in "the substantial and continuing failure to meet
disclosure requirements" violates professional standards if he does not
take "prompt steps to end the cl[i]ent's non-compliance."291 These
steps could include counseling accurate disclosure, approaching the
board of directors or other senior management, or resigning if the
conduct becomes "extreme or irretrievable."292
C. Does Equity Billing Undermine the Gatekeeping Role of
Lawyers?
The reason that gatekeepers are effective at detecting and con-
trolling misconduct is that they are outsiders. 293 Managers, who are
insiders, have insufficiently diversified interests to act as effective gate-
keepers. Their salaries, compensation, and careers are tied to the
firm. Their personal success depends on the success of the firm.
Managers may stand to gain handsomely if the firm gains by engaging
in misconduct. On the other hand, outsiders such as law firms are
diversified. They do not only act for one client. The law firm has a
reputation and the individual lawyers comprising the firm have repu-
tations and careers that have been built up over time. Relative to in-
side managers, outside lawyers have more to lose than to gain by
participating in a client firm's misconduct.294
Taking equity in clients shifts the incentives of lawyers so that
they become more aligned with the interests of their clients. If the
effectiveness of outsiders and insiders as gatekeepers were placed
along a spectrum, then by taking equity, lawyers move from being
more like outsiders to being more like insiders. As a result, the securi-
ties market gatekeeping regime described above would be made mar-
ginally less effective by lawyers' taking equity in their clients.
However, two issues need to be addressed. First, are law firms
truly outsiders even in the absence of equity billing? Second, how
much of a difference does taking equity really make? On the issue of
whether law firms are really outsiders, one can question how much law
firms rely on individual clients for business. Even when paid in cash
on an hourly basis, law firms are quite financially dependent on their
clients for a future stream of income. They may already have the in-
centives to ignore or support client misconduct because they do not
want to lose a particular client's business. While equity billing may
push the lawyer's incentives toward complicity, the more important
291 Id. at 84,172.
292 PALMrrER, supra note 227, at 372. On this point, professional rules of ethics require
more drastic action by the lawyer. ABA Model Rule 1.16(a) mandates resignation of a
lawyer who by continuing the representation would assist the client's fraud. MODEL RULES
OF PROF'L CoNDucr R. 1.16(a) (2000).
293 See Kraakman, supra note 231, at 891.
294 Se id.
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not addressing the scope of the term "seller" for the purposes of sec-
tion 12(a) (2),281 many courts and commentators define the scope of
the term similarly for the purposes of the two provisions,282 and it is
not unreasonable to expect that gatekeepers can potentially face lia-
bility under section 12(a) (2) as well. Furthermore, a due diligence
defense similar to that available under section 11 is also available
under section 12(a) (2).283
4. Administrative Sanctions
In addition to seeking injunctive action, pursuing civil penalties,
and issuing cease-and-desist orders, 284 the SEC also has the power to
discipline securities professionals such as lawyers and accountants.
The SEC Rules of Practice authorize the SEC to deny the privilege of
appearing or practicing before it if it determines after a fair hearing
that a person lacks qualifications, character, or integrity, or willfully
violates or aids or abets a violation of federal securities laws. 285 Nota-
bly, in actions imposing civil penalties, the SEC is also authorized to
prohibit a person who has violated section 12(a) (1) from acting as an
officer or director of a publicly held corporation. 286
In In re Carter,287 the SEC sanctioned two Wall Street corporate
lawyers who were advising a financially troubled client on the liquida-
tion of its business.288 The lawyers failed to intervene when their cli-
ent released overstated financial projections and positive press
releases to the market but withheld information on the company's fi-
nancial problems.28 9 In its opinion, the SEC stated that "the effective
implementation of investor safeguards mandated by the securities laws
depends heavily on the performance of attorneys engaged in advising
their clients. ' 290 The SEC further held that a lawyer who is aware that
281 See Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642 n.20.
282 See Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1989) (stating
that "[s]ince Pinter, other courts of appeals have addressed this question and have con-
cluded that the Pinterapproach to § 12(1) should be applied to § 12(2)" and citing cases).
283 Sanders v.John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1228 (7th Cir. 1980); SODERQUIST &
GABALDON, supra note 227, at 296.
284 See SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 244.
285 See 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) (2001); see also Touche Ross & Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570,
582 (2d Cir. 1979) (upholding the SEC's authority to make Rule 2(e)-now Rule of Prac-
tice 102(e)-an adjunct to assuring the integrity of its administrative procedures and the
goal of protecting the investing public).
286 SODERQUIST & GABALDON, supra note 227, at 244.
287 Release No. 34-17597, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at
84,145 (Feb. 28, 1981).
288 See id. at 84,150-64.
289 See id. at 84,165-69.
290 Id. at 84,173 (concurring and dissenting opinion by Commissioner Evans) (citing
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); Felts v. Nat'l Account Sys.
Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67 (N.D. Miss. 1978)).
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question is how much the incentives will shift relative to existing in-
centives, which brings us to the second issue.
The extent of the shift will depend on how much of an equity
interest is at stake. The greater the equity interest, the more the law
firm's fortunes are tied to the success of the client. All else being
equal, a five percent equity interest is more threatening to a
gatekekeeping regime than a one percent equity interest. However,
not all clients are created equal. A five percent stake in Company A
may actually shift the incentives less than a one percent stake in Com-
pany B if Company A has a market capitalization of $100 million and
Company B has a capitalization that is many times that. Additionally,
not all law firms are created equal. An equity interest in a client has to
be assessed in the context of the value of the law firm's reputation and
its wealth and income from other clients. If a law firm and its lawyers
have invested significant capital in creating a strong reputation, a
greater equity stake will be required to shift their incentives.
Furthermore, in a public offering, both the issuer and the under-
writer have legal representation, so that even if the issuer's counsel is
holding equity in its client and not performing its gatekeeping role,
counsel for the underwriter will continue to have unaltered incentives
to perform its gatekeeping function.295 Presumably, the underwriter's
counsel will exercise heightened scrutiny once the issuer's counsel's
equity position is disclosed pursuant to Regulation S-K of the Securi-
ties Act ("Regulation S-K") which imposes an obligation on an issuer's
law firm among others to disclose stock ownership in an issuer.29 6
While Item 403 of Regulation S-K requires that any beneficial owner-
ship of more than five percent of any class of a company's voting stock
be disclosed, most law firms that engage in equity billing will not ex-
ceed the five percent threshold partly because they have voluntarily
imposed lower maximum limits. 29 7 In addition, a law firm may be re-
quired to disclose its ownership interest under Item 509 of Regulation
S-K which requires that any expert or counsel who is to receive a "sub-
stantial" interest in a company in connection with the offering provide
a brief statement of the interest in the related prospectus. 298
However, the quality of the mandated disclosure tends to be
sparse. The WebVan prospectus, for example, includes language stat-
ing that "[a]s of the date of this prospectus, members of Wilson Son-
sini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. and an investment partnership composed
295 It has been stated that issuer's counsel is the quarterback in securities transactions,
but when he is junior or inexperienced, underwriter's counsel picks up the slack. Loss &
SELIGNAN, supra note 64, at 1199.
296 17 C.F.R § 229.10-.1016 (2001).
297 Id. § 229.403.
298 Substantial is defined as greater than $50,000 for the purposes of Item 509 of Regu-
lation S-K. Id. § 229.509.
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of current and former members of and persons associated with Wilson
Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. beneficially owned an aggregate of
2,068,944 shares of common stock."299 A strong argument can be
made that the SEC should require heightened disclosure of the de-
tailed terms of equity billing arrangements between law firms and
their clients, similar to the extensive disclosure that is required of
compensation of directors and officers and related-party
transactions.300
V
THE REGULATION OF EQurY BILLING
In light of the concern over whether the practice of equity billing
will cause a significant ethical erosion within the legal profession, this
Article will now address the relative merits of the preventative mea-
sures that society might use to limit or avoid the practice's more unde-
sirable consequences. These preventative tools include an outright
prohibition on equity billing, a limit on the amount of equity that a
client could exchange for legal services, or a free-market approach
that depends on heightened disclosure requirements for equity hold-
ings by law firms. A brief discussion of the relative merits of each of
these options follows. Even a brief analysis reveals that the third op-
tion, that of heightening disclosure requirements, is the most effective
and practical solution to the equity billing dilemma, and best fits the
realities of the current legal system.
A. Outright Prohibition
The most extreme proposal that can be put forth to regulate eq-
uity billing would be to prohibit it. An argument can be made that
equity billing should be prohibited along the same lines that contin-
gency fees are prohibited in divorce and criminal-law matters. How-
ever, it seems that a client who agrees to equity billing is not in the
same position, generally speaking, as a family-law or criminal-law cli-
ent, and that the benefits of equity billing outweigh the real or per-
ceived threats to the public interest.
Alternatively, one could attempt to rationalize a rule prohibiting
equity billing on the basis that the arrangement creates too great a
conflict between lawyers' self-interests and clients' best interests. How-
ever, as Parts II and III conclude, lawyers are not necessarily more
conflicted under equity billing arrangements than under more tradi-
tional billing models. In addition, a rule prohibiting equity billing
299 WEBVAN GROUP, INC., PROSPECTUS, Form 424(b) (1), at 65 (Registration No. 333-
84703, filed Nov. 4, 1999), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092657/
0000891618-99-004914.txt.
300 See 17 G.F.R. § 229.402 (2001).
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would be inconsistent with the rules and principles governing rela-
tionships between other types of fiduciaries and the individuals or en-
tities for whose benefit they act, for example, directors and
corporations.30 1
An alternative policy basis for prohibiting equity billing is that it
undermines the gatekeeping role traditionally performed by securities
lawyers. While the analysis in Part IV above concludes that a securities
lawyer's gatekeeping role will be made marginally less effective by tak-
ing equity in her client, it also questions whether issuer's counsel is
truly an outsider as envisioned by the theory of gatekeeping.30 2 A
compelling case can be made that, even in the absence of equity bill-
ing, the effectiveness of the securities law firm as a gatekeeper is un-
dermined by the simple fact that the firm is financially dependent on
its clients for future streams of income. Furthermore, in situations in
which counsel for the issuer is required to disclose its holding of a
client's equity, underwriters' counsel can be expected to be on alert
and take a more active role in its gatekeeping function.
Let us assume that despite the analysis above, we continue to be
in favor of a rule that prohibits lawyers from engaging in equity bill-
ing. Because much of the concern with equity billing does not relate
to the actual transaction between the lawyer and the client but rather
to the incentives created by the lawyer holding the client's equity, a
rule prohibiting lawyers from equity billing would have to be insti-
tuted in conjunction with a second rule that would prohibit lawyers
from owning equity in their clients. There is, of course, no such pro-
hibition at present.
B. Capping the Amount of Equity
A more nuanced solution would involve placing an upper limit
on the amount of equity that a client could exchange for legal ser-
vices. This upper limit would represent the amount of equity in a
client that could be held by a law firm in order to eliminate or mini-
mize conflict of interest concerns. The upper limit could be set as a
percentage of the client's total equity, but as the analysis in earlier
parts of the Article concludes, the cap would have to take into account
the value of the client's equity relative to the value of the law firm's
reputation, wealth, and income stream.30 3 Thus, what appears to be a
bright-line solution rapidly disintegrates into a context-specific inquiry
depending heavily on the particular client and law firm involved.
301 See discussion supra Part III.
302 See discussion supra Part IV.
303 See supra text accompanying notes 293-96.
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C. Heightened Disclosure
The most appropriate approach in this context would allow ex-
isting legal and ethical rules and market forces to regulate equity bill-
ing, but only if coupled with heightened disclosure. Ethical rules on
reasonable fees and business transactions between lawyers and clients
are sufficient to ensure that the initial transaction between a lawyer
and her client is fair and free of conflict. In light of Passante,30 4 the
lawyer bears the risk that the equity billing arrangement is not en-
forceable unless it is fair and reasonable to the client and the other
procedural requirements have been met.30 5 In relation to conflicts
that may arise between lawyers and clients as a result of equity billing,
ethical rules place the onus on lawyers to resign or obtain their cli-
ents' consent. The analysis in Part III highlights that many other con-
flicts between a lawyer and her client are regulated in this fashion and
that the potential conflicts posed by equity billing are not dissimilar to
those posed by a lawyer's financial dependency on her clients using
traditional billing methods. 306
While a securities lawyer's gatekeeping role may be made margin-
ally less effective by equity billing, the extent of its negative effect de-
pends on many factors, as noted above. It should also be noted that if
a lawyer is charged with an offense relating to her client's wrongdoing
in the securities context, her equity interest may be used as evidence
by which a judge or jury may reasonably infer her intent to assist or
aid the client in the misconduct. 30 7 The possibility of liability will in-
duce law firms to establish voluntarily rules and caps on equity billing
ex ante.308 It should also be noted that law firms that engage in equity
billing may be caught under the definition of "underwriter," exposing
them to greater liability.30 9 Finally, underwriters' counsel will play a
more active role once it is disclosed that issuers' counsel engaged in
304 Passante v. McWilliam, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 298 (Ct. App. 1997).
305 See id. at 301-03.
306 See discussion supra Part III.
307 "[T]he [law] firm's stake in the client will constitute evidence from which a
factfinder may legitimately infer the lawyer's intent to aid any subsequently-discovered cli-
ent illegality resulting from the lawyer's (perhaps unknowing) assistance." HAZARD Er AL.,
supra note 105, at 736. Brian Redding, an associate loss-prevention counsel at the Chicago-
based Attorneys Liability Assurance Society, emphasizes that "[tihe problem from a mal-
practice standpoint is perception .... In the one out of 100 or 200 cases where a law firm
gets sued for SEC or other legal violations, its primary defense is lack ofscienter.... If the
case goes to ajury and you appear to be closely aligned with the client, you'll lose." Baker,
supra note 1, at 39.
308 Many law firms, in fact, do internally regulate equity billing. For example, VLG
takes such large investments in some businesses that it refuses to provide legal services to
them on the basis of conflict-of-interest concerns. Cash? How Old Economy, supra note 10, at
68.
309 See MARC I. STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW 127-29 (2d ed. 1996) (dis-
cussing the "inadvertent underwriter problem").
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equity billing. As analyzed in Part IV above, the SEC should require
heightened disclosure of the terms of equity billing arrangements, not
unlike the detailed disclosure that is required of executive compensa-
tion of officers and directors.
CONCLUSION
While the practice of lawyers taking a stake in a client's business is
not new, the recent phenomenal growth of the technology sector ap-
pears to have fueled interest in equity billing. While it remains to be
seen how the popularity and terms of equity billing arrangements will
change as the market for technology stock rises and falls, equity bill-
ing provides significant private and public benefits that are best regu-
lated through the application of existing ethical rules, fiduciary
principles, and liability rules.
